

facts are overpoweringly dominated by and enveloped in the Negation. (It should be remembered that argument and analogy are also all ultimately founded on and start from a basis of some *pratyaksha*, some sensuous fact, or other.)

Because the human is entitled, as well as subject, to *karma* and *phala* in the special sense, therefore is the direction or advice given to him to strive after, to achieve, *Brahman*.

Human *karma* may be sub-divided into two kinds: (1) the (self-seeking) *karma* that binds, (2) the (self-sacrificing) *karma* that frees. The former is all action done with the consciousness of and tending to strengthen further the connexion between the I and the This; the latter is that which is performed under the consciousness of the Negation. In other words, the one is performed under the consciousness of the separateness of *jīvas*, each being regarded as indissolubly connected with its *upādhi* or enveloping sheath; the other is performed with the consciousness of the Oneness of all.

From one standpoint, that of effectiveness or the successful achievement of the purpose immediately aimed at, either of these two kinds may be sub-divided further into (1) exactly appropriate or *yukta*, (2) inappropriate or

*a-yukta*, (3) helpful or *upa-yukta*. But a far more important sub-division for practical, *i.e.*, ethical, purposes is that already briefly alluded to before, *viz.*, of the *karma* that binds into (1) *pāpa* or sin, corresponding to U and (2) *punya* or merit, corresponding to A, the third of the triplet being (3) the *kārya* or duty that frees, corresponding with M. In terms of the logion, I-This-I is *punya*, This-I-This is *pāpa*, and Not-This-I is *mokṣha*.

The consequence of *punya* or meritorious action is *sukha*, pleasure, joy or happiness, to the actor; whereas that of *pāpa* or sin is *duḥkha*, pain, sorrow or misery. Ordinarily of course pleasure and pain, joy and sorrow, are opposed to each other, as much as sin and merit; but, in the ultimate essence, they are forms or transformations of each other, even as sin and merit are; by the metaphysical law, each hides its opposite within itself, and is therefore in a sense identical with it. This may be inferred from the fact that the very same circumstances that are pleasurable to one person at any one time are painful to another person at that same time and again painful to that same person at another time. The explanation of all this is to be found in the fact of the underlying unity of the Self, temporarily broken up by the manyness of the bodies. The *jīva*



that gives a pleasure to another jīva gives the pleasure to himself; so the pain also, which he gives to another, he gives in reality to himself; and therefore the pleasure and the pain come back to him at a later time. These very facts of the Unity of the I, and the identification of the I and the This, and the This and the I, are the reason why there is a reaction to every action.<sup>1</sup>

But how is it possible for the Self ever to find any satisfaction in giving pain to itself, and how, therefore, do any evil actions take place at all? How should the Self even bear the sight, the thought, of pain to itself, much less cause it?

<sup>1</sup> The carrying out of this metaphysical law in terms of matter is effected, it would seem, by means of the registration in the superphysical bodies corresponding with the supraliminal consciousness, of the parties concerned, of their mutual debts and assets and the readjustment of the latter, from the Central Chief Court in the heart of the Sun, (the Hiraṇyagarbha, the Ruler of our System, whose Individuality unifies us all, as cells in an individual organism), or corresponding lower centres in the various planets (like the nerve-ganglia whence reflex action takes place—the brain being the overlord of them all—as our Yama, judge of souls, is a son of the Sun) by means of a special class of rays, rashmi, referred to in the *Upaniṣhads*. (See the commentary called *Paramārtha-prapā*, by Sūrya Daivajña on the *Bhagavad-Gītā*).

Should not compassion and sweet sympathy alone prevail everywhere in the circumstances mentioned? True; but it is just because and when the Self is excessively identified with a sheath, a body, a piece of the Not-Self, and therefore loses the consciousness of its unity with all jīvas and regards itself as separate from them, that hate and selfishness and sin arise; such a self feels that its pleasures can be secured only by snatching from, and not derived by sharing with, others; to it the pain of another is a means to its own pleasure. It is such jīvas, when at the climax of their egoism, that are described as “the asaj-jana, ḍur-jana, who by their causeless hatred are a source of terror to all beings, and in whose mouth the cruel and injurious word of evil power ever dwells, as venom in the fang of the serpent”.

The excessive predominance of the This, the body, is the general cause of the nature becoming so full of hate that special causes are no longer needed to excite it; this is the significance of the adjective causeless here. But even such natures are not wholly bereft and abandoned of the benignity of the Self. For have they not also friends amongst congenial jīvas? It is true that because of their trustless and untrustworthy nature they make no friends amongst the good men, and the



world at large regards them as unfriendly; but evil men are the friends of evil men, for the fulfilment of each other's needs; and though the mutual help and association be for nefarious purposes only, yet, still, as mutual help and association it indicates that ruling majesty, that gracious mercy, of the Self which alone makes human life and intercourse, indeed any life, possible, and transmutes evil into good. For, surely, so far as evil men help each other they are good to each other. On the other hand, the This, the Not-Self, too, will not be ignored, and as the Self produces good out of all evil things, so this creates a semblance of evil in the good. Thus the men whom the world recognises as good men, the ṛṣhis, maharṣhis, munis, brāhmaṇas, etc., have to set themselves against the evil ones and thwart their wishes and cause them pain, regarding them as separate; so that to the evil the good behave as evil. So, again, if a physician, in endeavoring to cure a patient, administers in good faith a medicine which unfortunately happens to have too strong an effect and to kill him, the physician incurs no sin although he has given pain, but rather gains puṇya because of his endeavor to cure. On the other, hand, to give food to those who have already eaten their fill is in reality an act of sin though apparently one of charity. Yet again,

no person dies till his time comes in accordance with his own past karma, but if he should die by the deliberate act of another, be slain wrongfully by another, though that slaying be in accordance with that karma, yet that other will have incurred sin also. Natural death is called maraṇa, unnatural death hanana. The difference between the two is simply this, that the one is brought about by subtle and less-known causes, and the other by gross and known ones. To take one more instance: tears overflow out of the excess of joy as well as sorrow. In the one case the pity is for others who are not so happy as ourselves and with whom we would like to share our joy; in the other, the pity is for our own unhappy inferiority which needs to be and may be helped by others who have more than we. Thus intricately interlaced are the opposites everywhere, always passing by invisible gradations, the one into the other, always eluding and evading the close scrutiny, although, to the superficial view, they appeared to have well-marked differences.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Compare the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, verse ii. 28: "The beginning and the end, the birth and the death, the source and the mergence, of things are, and are in the, in-de-finite. Their middle condition only is apparently definite." "From the great deep to the great deep he goes".



From all the above it is obvious that, generally speaking, joy, love, virtue, altruism, and svarga or heaven go together; and sorrow, hate, vice, selfishness, and narakā or purgatory form the opposite group; while mokṣha, peace, niṣh-kāma karma or desireless duty (*i.e.*, duty which is free from all *selfish* desire) and all-inclusiveness are different from both.

It has been said that sin and merit both bind the jīva to the World-process. This probably requires a brief word of explanation. For, apparently, acts of merit may be regarded as having the effect of emancipation. But this is not so. Even in the act of merit (as distinguished from the act of duty) the sense of separateness is present. It is much more present in the act of sin, truly; but it is present in the other also. It is predominantly present in sin; subordnately so in merit. The sense of the unity of the Self, which prevails in the latter, does so instinctively, sub-consciously, so to say; not deliberately, with conscious realisation, as in mokṣha. Hence, while this fact shows how virtue is the indispensable threshold of the abode of mokṣha, it also shows that virtue is not identical with mokṣha. In the act of merit, the helper, the giver, feels that he is giving to *another*; and the helped, the receiver, similarly feels that he has received from *another*. This is

the manifest feeling on both sides; (and corresponding to it is the unmanifested, the sub-conscious feeling—due to the Necessity of Unity and balance in supersession and rectification of the illusion of separateness, 'the feeling of *another*', and the disturbance of the balance—that 'I shall get back, later on, what I have given now,' on the one side, and that 'I shall pay back, later on, what I have taken now,' on the other); and these saṅkalpas, inner resolutions, bind both parties to the chain of karma. The binding in the case of acts of sin is obvious. In mokṣha, on the other hand, (the conscious and the sub-conscious have merged into one, and) the deliberate feeling is that I give only to my-Self and take only from my-Self; (and thus no new karma, in the special human sense, is created by the mukṭa, and the chain of the old prārabḍha is gradually exhausted and worn out.

From another standpoint it may be said that while pāpa or sin implies svārṭha or selfishness in the fullest sense, namely, of the sense of separate personality narrowed down to its extreme point, puṇya or merit or parārṭha *i.e.*, altruism or unselfishness is only the larger selfishness that works for the well-being of a whole 'group-soul', (whence we have such phases and phrases as parochialism, provincialism,



patriotism, nationalism, humanism, etc., all contrasted with, and yet possessing a common feature also with, individualism). The fact of the 'spreading' of karma is brought about by the presence of this group-soul.<sup>1</sup> Within the limits of each such sūtrātmā, each and all are responsible for the good and evil acts of each and all, and the father's sins are visited on the children, or the latter reap the reward of the former's good deeds.<sup>2</sup> It is the existence of this group-soul also, with its consequent action and reaction on many of the acts of one, which makes mutual advice, counsel, instruction, consultation and remonstrance, and the formation of alliances, etc., not only possible but necessary, as more than once stated before. Hence also the reiterated injunction to seek good and avoid evil company, except when there is a need to cure the evil and

<sup>1</sup> See *The Science of Social Organisation*, p. 291.

<sup>2</sup> Many branches of national and international law, regarding inheritance and succession, torts and liabilities of third parties, responsibilities of governments and nations to each other for acts of subjects etc., are illustrations of this.

In Saxon times, in England, every village was held responsible for the misdeeds of its individual inhabitants. In modern days, in India, extra police are quartered on a whole town if a few inhabitants how any unusual spirit of disorderliness.

one's ability to do so is certain. Mokṣha, on the other hand, is the universalism which includes both individualism and limited communism; it is the param-ārtha which assimilates both sv-ārtha and par-ārtha.

It has been said before that svarga and naraka correspond to pleasure and pain, to merit and sin, respectively. In one sense, therefore they are both only 'internal', like the others. In terms of the Logion, moreness, ādhikya, the predominance of the I over the This is svarga; and conversely, the moreness or predominance of the This over the I is naraka. But, in another sense, because there is always an external corresponding to an internal, therefore they are definite localities also, Kāma-loka etc. Ordinarily, it is true, the consequences are expressed in the same terms as the acts, sṭhūla of sṭhūla, sūkshma of sūkshma; the rewards or punishments of physical merits or sins are enjoyed or suffered in a physical birth, and so on; yet because in each such act of the physical body all the other bodies are also involved and brought into play in some degree or other, therefore consequences in that degree have to be undergone in the excarnate lives of those bodies. And, by special arrangement, while evil actions are expiated in Kāma-loka,



good deeds are reaped in Svarga.<sup>1</sup> The details and sub-divisions here, as elsewhere, are endless. There are two main divisions of Kāma-loka,

<sup>1</sup> The ideas contained in the text here and those of current theosophical literature may be made to supplement each other somewhat as follows: (1) The actor as such, of a sin or merit, is one, and he as one organic whole performs the act, the whole of his being comes into play in each such performance—this from the outer standpoint of the spectator, the third party. (2) But the actor is dual in nature, an inner core and an outer sheath, a conscious jīva, and a material body. And the conscious jīva, again, is represented by a material body at that stage of human evolution when sin and merit, karma in the special sense, the sense which implies bondage and emancipation, alternatives and choice, compelling motives and free-will, have become possible. (See *The Science of Peace*, p. 273.) But sin means predominance of the Eṭaṭ-consciousness, and merit—of the I-consciousness; and both are inseparably present in each jīva. Therefore this inner core-body is again sub-divided into a līṅga and a sūkṣhma, or a lower sūkṣhma and a higher sūkṣhma, or an astral and a mental, a kāmaloṅkika and a svargika—however we may prefer to word it. (3) In every act of sin, though the whole man is engaged, yet, also, the eṭaṭ-portion of the inner core, the līṅga or lower sūkṣhma or astral or

viz., A-kāma and Sa-kāma, and each of these has seven sub-divisions, and those again may be graded. So, also, Svarga has two main divisions, Sa-rūpa and A-rūpa, and each of these

kāmaloṅkika body is in more intense operation, while the other, the I-portion or higher sūkṣhma or kāraṇa, is in comparative abeyance—on the psychic side belonging to the inner consciousness; the physical side, belonging to the outer body, being the external act of sin. Conversely, in every act of merit, the sūkṣhma or higher sūkṣhma or mental or svargika body is in operation while the other is in abeyance. (4) The result is that, in the endless chain and complication of causes and effects, events succeeding events, (a) while that portion of the act which is performed by the whole man is rewarded or punished in the next physical life of the whole man, (b) the psychic element of sin is punished in Kāma-loka, and (c) the psychic element of virtue rewarded in Svarga; and (d) all this, again, it must be remembered, is true only of the *human entity* whose *normal* life at this stage is the physical life, its post-mortem conditions being special conditions passed in *special* prepared portions of the other worlds corresponding to his psychic bodies—even as jails or palaces on the physical plane are specially assigned to specially-qualified individuals. To other entities, normal inhabitants of those worlds, there is no such exclusive



is sub-divided seven times and each of these has finer sub-divisions, and so on endlessly. All these are enumerated in the *Vedas*, but are in reality innumerable. The only thing that is possible is to form some vague idea of the less-

suffering or exclusive luxury; to those to whom those planes are their normal habitat, as the physical plane is to us, pain and pleasure, good and evil, sin and merit, are both possible, nay actual, on each of their respective planes, as to us on the physical.

With regard to the sub-divisions of planes or worlds mentioned in the succeeding sentences of the text, we may see that, if the views propounded in the preceding paragraph of this footnote are correct, they correspond to the physical and etheric sub-divisions of the physical plane or world, on the one hand, and the continents and countries of the physical world (and presumably similar sub-divisions of the etheric world) on the other. Animate and inanimate, or civilised and uncivilised, or earthly, aquatic, aerial etc., etc., and similar endlessly complicated sub-divisions have in all probability also their parallels on all the other planes. We have scores of names for these various planes and parts of planes, in the *Purāṇas*: Bhūrloka, Bhuvah, Svah, Mahah, Janah, Tāpah, Satyam, Go-loka, Vaikuntha, Shiva-loka, Rudra-loka, Piṭṛ-loka, Preṭa-loka, Agni-loka, Vāyu-loka, Indra-loka, Varuṇa-loka, Sūrya-

known with the help of and by reasoning from the better-known. For those who wish to enter into this matter further and achieve the calculus of the incalculable, the study of *Bīja-gaṇīta* or algebra is prescribed.

But above and beyond and around all these endless details is the infinity and eternity and motionless calm of mokṣha, which, from Time's standpoint, is always being realised in part by the feeling of universal love, and in the remaining parts by corresponding thought and action. The more fully the three main appetites of the jīva fall away from him, the lok-eṣhaṇā, the appetite for the world, for life amidst our fellow-beings and for recognition by them, the viṭṭ-eṣhaṇā, the appetite for wealth, for enhanced bodily and material life, and the puṭṛ-eṣhaṇā, the appetite for multiplication, for the perpetuation of the individual life in and by progeny; corresponding to cognition, desire and action;—so more and more fully does the consciousness of peace and of emancipation grow towards perfection, till all separateness is negated and the Self alone is seen always and everywhere to reign supreme,

loka, Chandra-loka, Nāga-loka, Gandharva-loka, Aṭala, Viṭala, Suṭala, Tālāṭala, Rasāṭala, Mahāṭala, Pāṭāla, Dvīpas, Varṣhas, Āvartas, etc., etc.

And joy and sorrow, acts of sin and merit,  
 Virtue and vice, and truth and falsity,  
 Goodness and evilness, and love and hate,  
 Friendship and enmity, and mine and thine,  
 Heaven and hell, reward and punishment,  
 Bondage and liberation—all are lost  
 In One continuum, One shoreless vast,  
 One centred plenitude of Consciousness,  
 In One immensity of boundless Being,  
 In One eternity of Bliss, peace, AUM !

PEACE TO ALL BEINGS.

ॐ

शुभमस्तु सर्वजगताम्  
 सर्वो भद्राणि पश्यतु  
 लोकाः समस्ताः सुखिनो भवन्तु ॥  
 ॐ

## IN MEMORIAM

अहह घोरतरं नु किमाचरम्  
 दुरितमंतरितं प्रिय येन ते ।  
 सुनयनं सुनसं सततस्मितं  
 वदनकं मम दुर्भगचक्षुषोः ॥ १ ॥

नहि पदा पदमेकमथाक्रम-  
 स्त्वमु सहाययुतोऽपि धरातले ।  
 अहह दूरतमं हि महाऽध्वनाम्  
 कथमितोऽसि विहाय सहायकान् ॥ २ ॥

किमु मदाचरितैर्दुरनादरैः  
 कुसुमकोमलचित्त विषादितः ।  
 मयि विसृज्य रुजा कमलाऽमलं  
 मलिनदेहजनिं स्वतनुं गतः ॥ ३ ॥

प्रणयि ते हृदयं प्रतिचाटुभिः  
 नहि समर्चयतां पितरौ यतः ।

A



अपरकार्यरतौ कुग्गृहस्थका-  
विति नु वत्स पितामहमब्रजः ॥ ४ ॥

दलति चित्तमपि हलते मनः  
चलति बुद्धिरहं ननु नश्यति ।  
अपुनरागमनाय गतस्य ते  
सुममुखं स्मरतोः स्मरसुंदरम् ॥ ५ ॥

गगनशांतगभीरविलोकितम्  
तव शरद्वनचन्द्रसितस्मितम् ।  
सलिलबुद्बुदहासविकूजितम्  
कथमिव स्मरतोर्ध्रियते मनः ॥ ६ ॥

कदलिकानवपल्लवपेलवम्  
लवलिकाफलवन्मसृणद्युति ।  
तव सदा स्मरतोः शिशुकांगकम्  
नहि धृतिं मनुते मन आवयोः ॥ ७ ॥

शिशुक शावक बालक तोकक  
पृथुक डिम्भक देहज गर्भज ।  
अहह नो शृणुषे लपितानि नौ  
प्रति न कूजसि न स्मयसेऽपि वा ॥ ८ ॥

अहह कोमलकुंचितकुंतलम्  
प्रतनुकर्णकमूर्मिसमाचितम् ।  
सुचिबुकं पृथुदीप्तललाटकम्  
मृदुकपोलदलं रुचिराधरम् ॥ ९ ॥

बृहदुरः सुकुमारतरोदरम्  
मृदुलपीनमुजांसकशोभितम् ।  
ललितपाटलपाणिपदांगुलिम्  
सुरचितं नवपुष्पचयोपमम् ॥ १० ॥

दयित ते सुमनामुकुलं वपुः  
अदयकालवशात्परिरक्षितुम् ।  
नहि कथंचन हा यदपारयम्  
स्मृतिवपुस्स्थितये तदहं यते ॥ ११ ॥

व्यथितजीवसमाश्वसनाय या  
करुणमूर्तिमहर्षिकृतिः स्थिता ।  
अपि तया सह बाल तव स्मृतिम्  
व्यथितहृद्ग्रथये करुणोचितः ॥ १२ ॥

अविरतं हि मुनेर्हृदये दया  
स्फुरति दीनशिशोरनुकंपया ।



सुकृतहीनतया यदि नाशकम्  
स हि महान् अवने प्रभविष्यति ॥ १३ ॥

अपि मुने भवतोऽधिकसेवया  
यदि सुतं बत नाऽलमपालयम् ।  
कथमधीनजनस्य जने कृपा  
नहि कृता भवतेति विमुह्यते ॥ १४ ॥

अहह तत्क्षमतां मम जल्पितम्  
ननु दयामय वेद्मि तवेशितम् ।  
किमु विनाशितनौ कृपया न वा  
ऽमरकलेवरमस्य विधास्यासि ॥ १५ ॥

ज्ञानात्मनोऽनन्यभक्त्या  
पुण्यं चेत्किञ्चिदार्जयम् ।  
तन्मेऽस्तु मृतपुत्रस्य  
सूर्यकांतस्य शांतये ॥ १६ ॥

प्रथयसेऽथ कथं वितथां कथाम्  
स्थिरय मूढमनः शमचेतनाम् ।  
नहि तवेव जनस्य दयामयम्  
कृतकमाणवको ह्यनुजीवति ॥ १७ ॥

ननु कुलानि गृहाणि मनांसि नो  
भगवतो वशतः प्रियर्किंकरः ।  
मम समीपमपि त्वमु पापिनो  
दयित पावयितुं समवातरः ॥ १८ ॥

भसितलिप्ततनुं हसितेक्षणम्  
परमशांतिसमध्युषिताननम् ।  
गृहजनः स्वत एव विलोक्य यम्  
ह्यनमदप्यवधूत इति ह्वयन् ॥ १९ ॥

मयि विदेशगते भृशतापिते  
त्वयि रुजा स्वपती परमातुरा ।  
निशि भवंतमवंतमलोकयत्  
कमपि दिव्यजनं जननी तदा ॥ २० ॥

सुकृतलेशवशात्परजन्मनो  
मम तवैव नु दुष्कृततोऽथवा ।



मयि जने मलिनेऽप्युषितः पुनः  
गत इतो न समाप्य समात्रयम् ॥ २१ ॥

तव समागमनेन पवित्रिते  
मम गृहे मुनिनेव वराशिषा ।  
प्रणववाद इति श्रुतिपावनः  
चिरविलुप्तकथः पुनरभ्युदैत् ॥ २२ ॥

अनुविधाय महेशनिदेशितम्  
परमपावनशास्त्रसमापनम् ।  
प्रतिनिवृत्त इमान्विधुराञ्जनान्  
सदय पावयितुं पुनराव्रजेः ॥ २३ ॥