

SECTION III. (*Continued.*)

CHAPTER XXX.

THE ENDLESS MOODS OF THE OPPOSITES, LOVE AND
HATE.

Three main sub-divisions of love.—Of hate.—Superiority, equality, inferiority.—Different names of the triplet for the two sides, of love and of hate.—Correspondences with A, U and M.—Why the ‘marks’ of the Self are spoken of as six, rather than three.—Metaphysical transcendence, by the Self, of all marks.

The nature and origin of the special emotions may be considered here, to illustrate one psychological aspect of the endless moods of the pair of opposites.

Under *rāga*, we note that when one *jīva* feels with regard to another, ‘this other I is greater than I, I am smaller than he, he can supply my wants’—then the relationship with this other I that is formed in the mind of the *īva* is the emotion of *sneha*, affectionate respect, reverence. In this condition of *sneha*, the *jīva* thinks or feels: ‘I am in this condition; thou (the other *jīva*) hast attained that higher one’; and it desires to arrive at that higher condition also, and, by reason of the Unity

of the I, places itself there. Such is the form or nature of sneha.

The modifications, kinds, grades or subdivisions of sneha are many: āḍara, respect, veneration; pūjā, worship, adoration; praṭiṣṭhā, honor, 'high-placing,' giving precedence. The arising or arousing of joy within oneself at sight of some one greater, under the conviction that by securing him (for friend) his status would be attained also, and consequent salutation of him, *i.e.*, the communication to him of one's needs and inferiority in every way—such is the nature of āḍara, reverence. But be it remembered that it is always joyous. Pūjā, worship, is the carrying out of his orders, doing his work; that is to say, acquiring gradually the necessary fitness for his position or status.¹ It is the serving of him in every possible and proper way to show and realise unity

¹In daily life, apprentices gradually become masters; private secretaries, chiefs; ministers, heads; etc. The *Rāma Pūrva Tāpinī Upaniṣad*, iv., explains that in the various mantras sacred to various devatās, which are prescribed for japa, repetition, the significance of the namah, salutation, is that of mental effort at identification. The *Rāma Tāpinī Uṭṭara* says the word, implying utter self-surrender, stands for highest bliss of mergence and identity.

with him even under separateness. Praṭiṣṭhā, honoring, high-placing, is the conveying, making known, prajñāpana, to one's inferior of one's (wish to bring him up to his) own greater or superior condition.¹ Saṭkāra is all this generally; it is 'good-making,' good manners, good behavior, good treatment. The karaṇa, doing, of that which is sat, good, true, right, proper—that is, saṭkāra. To know the unity of all, and to endeavor to realise it by trying to teach and help and uplift all—this is true saṭkāra. Towards the greater, it takes the form of reverence. They are pleased thereby.

Towards the smaller, it becomes compassion, already touched upon in the preceding chapter.

When there is similarity or equality, between jīva and jīva, there arises prīti, affection, between them. Maitrī, friendship, depends upon equality only. Those

¹The use of the word 'honor' in English is similar with that of praṭiṣṭhā in Samskr̥t, *i.e.*, double-sided. An inferior is 'honored' by a superior, as when a sovereign honors a good public servant with a title, etc. A superior is 'honored' by an inferior, as when children honor their parents. The underlying idea is the recognition of high merit.

whose *vyasana*, addictions, habits, tastes, amusements, interests, occupations, are the same, and who are the same, similar, or equal, in *buddhi* and *manas*, intelligence and activities—between such arises mutual friendship, bringing the highest pleasure to both. *Prīti* has two forms, *gaṇā* and *bhauṭikī*. The friendship that arises between a few, out of consonance of *guṇas*, qualities, characteristics, ways and habits—that is *gaṇā*, quality-born, (also, secondary). Universal friendliness and good-will for all *bhūtas*, all beings, is *bhauṭikī prīti*, born of the feeling that all are but the One Self. This is *uḍāra-chāritṛyam*, high-minded beneficence, noble conduct; this is *māhātmya*, great-souledness, magnanimity, which regards the whole world as a single brotherhood, *bhrātr̥tvena*, and, deeper still, as One Self. He to whom the world has thus grown I, who has realised universal brotherhood, *sarva-bhrātr̥bhāva*, he is the *sāḍhu*, the good man, the *paṇḍita*, the conscientious and wise and learned man, the *māhātmyā*, of great soul, the *māhāvṛṭṭi*, of great deeds, he is the *ṛṣhi* and the *māhā-ṛṣhi*, who has 'found' *Brahman*.

So far the moods of love.

On the other side, where *vṛṭṭis*, psychoses, moods of mind, temperaments, do not agree, are not *samāna* or similar, there arises *vaira*, enmity, instead of friendship. 'He is not like me. He cannot satisfy my requirements. What have I got to do with him?' Such is its form or nature as between equals, *sāmya-vaira*. Many are its grades, kinds, sub-divisions.

When one *jīva* endeavors insistently to reduce another to his own ways or views and the other does not accept these, then *kalaha* or dispute, bickering, altercation, arises. 'I have said this and done this. You have not listened to me and not done as I did.' Such insistence and obstinacy, *hāthya*, is the essence of *kalaha*. It may appear that disputes arise sometimes without any such *prayāsa*, deliberate effort or stubbornness. But, on careful analysis, it will always be found that they are based on the necessity, the constitutional needs, of the parties concerned, and these imply 'ruling passions,' 'character,' stubbornness. In consequence of the supremacy of the Self, each individual self or *jīva* (on the *pravṛṭṭi-mārga*, whereon separateness is predominant) feels that (its own work or way of

thinking is the only fit and proper one and that) the work or way of any other I is irrelevant, improper, inopportune. And accordingly it endeavors to teach the other I the right way, even at cost of pain, quite instinctively, or even, (when advanced to the stage of some degree of thoughtfulness) under the conviction that he is doing his duty thereby. This is the obstinacy above-mentioned. This should not be understood to imply that disagreements arise exclusively out of the endeavor of one jīva to *prevent* another, vāraṇa, from doing some thing. Other causes, apaharaṇa or deprivation, etc., are all included herein. It is true that, strictly, no I can take away from another I all Eṭaṭ whatsoever, for I and 'This' are inseparable, or even any particular eṭaṭ that an I has for the time being identified fully with itself; yet it is also true, at the same time, that each I thinks that it is the only I and the sole holder and proprietor of the right and title to possess anything and everything.

As sām̐ya or equality gives rise to one class of vaira or enmity, so mahat̐va and laghuṭ̐va, greatness or superiority and smallness or inferiority, give rise to other

kinds, just as on the side of rāga or love. In connexion with the sub-divisions of hate however it is customary to use the words prābalya, ḍaurbalya and ābalya,¹ instead of mahat̐va, laghuṭ̐va and sām̐ya. Prabala means stronger (while mahat̐ means greater); ḍurbala, weaker (as compared with laghu, smaller), and abala, strengthless (as compared with sama, equal)². A question might occur here. We sometimes see, in the world, that the smaller or lower is the stronger? The fact in such cases is that with reference to the special circumstances involved, he is really not the smaller at all but the greater. It may be that a man says to himself: 'I am the greater and this other is the smaller in the eyes of all; that he behaves as high and mighty is only due to my patient endurance of him,' etc. But the fact is that the 'all' whose opinion is here referred to are only those who are in the same condition as and in sympathy with the speaker. The 'all' who are in the

¹ This word is not current at the present day.

² Even in English the two sets of terms have two distinct associations; the one, of a tender comparison, within the family, so to say, for purposes of adjusting mutual help; the other, of an aggressive measurement of forces, for purposes of mutual harm or hindrance.

position of the other party think otherwise. And the truth is that whosoever can supply any want of another—he is, *in that respect*, stronger or greater than that other. And this is but natural and quite right; for, from the universal standpoint, nothing and no one is inherently greater or stronger than another; all are equally dependent on all; no one can live out his life and do his work independently of all others. The distinctions of higher, lower and level, or superior, inferior and equal, etc., are all appurtenant only to the realm of the limited—though to it they attach inseparably—and there they are based on the particular needs of particular individuals in particular times and places.

Māna, self-confidence, self-respect, dignity, pride, goes with greatness. It presents a dual aspect. On the side of love it takes this form: 'How shall this other and weaker, who is as much the Self as I, and is dependent on me, suffer under my very eyes? I *shall* remove his trouble, whatever the cost may be to myself.' This excellent or righteous pride is a great force for the service of the world, in its successive expansions from pride in one's own individual self to

pride in the country, pride in the race, etc., and, finally, pride in all beings.¹ Such pride is desirable and indeed necessary. Without it the work of the world would not proceed. On the side of *ḍveṣha*, this pride becomes *garvā* which says: 'The small is the small always; the great is always the great. I am I only. (I am self-sufficient, and none else is like me). What need have I of any other, small or great?' It is true that such a person too has needs which have to be supplied, and for the fulfilment of them he bends and stoops before the smallest of the small, but he does so always with the spirit of hostility and opposition at his heart (never realising the full and real significance of the fact; always obsessed with the overpowering sense of his own greatness; cursing inwardly and condemning and contemning with bitterness at heart even when compelled to show humility outwardly, and so keeping up a false sense of his own greatness). Such an one, as soon as his need is fulfilled at once lightly goes back to his previous mood, shallow and unenlightened as ever. He has no knowledge of the Self, but only of his *eṭaṭ*, the 'this,' the sheath,

¹ These various sub-divisions may, from one standpoint be characterised in terms of *saṭṭva*, *rajas* and *ṭamas*.

as the Self. And through and in that sheath, he blindly believes himself to be the actor, enjoyer, ruler of all, and separate from and above all. His one attitude of hostility towards all weaker than himself is: 'How dare you do this! You are not worthy of it! Do not try to rival or imitate me!' etc.

Bhaya, fear, is another form of *dveṣha* and *vaira*, hate and enmity. To believe and feel oneself weaker than the *praṭi-vāḍī*, the rival or opponent, is to fear. As the *Brahma-Sūtra* says: Ignorance of *āṇṭarya*, similarity or equality, is the mark of fear. This ignorance is inevitable where the sense of manyness prevails. The *Brahma-Sūtra*, indeed, defines *dveṣha*, which is the root of all these, fear, etc., as *anāṇṭaryam*, dissimilarity. Fear, etc., originate from it, as a general fact. Hence the saying: The weak are full of fear, *bhayārta*. Sometimes fear arises even without the presence of a definite enemy, at the mere prospect of some work or task only, about the details of which we are ignorant. But here also the opposition is present. This opposition exists between our own present condition (of inclination, energy,

knowledge, etc.), and the condition needed for the work. And when we feel the former to be the weaker then we feel fear. Hence fear has been defined also as the opposition of conditions, from the standpoint of *virāga*, (absence of inclination, when the mind shrinks from and fears to take up the burdens of the world).

Kroḍha, anger, is another form of *dveṣha*. When a *jīva*, feeling exclusively the importance of his own individual self, wishes to overleap the due order of events, and to express his own *chitta*, mind, too quickly and unsuccessfully—the mood of mind that results is anger. 'How is it thus and not thus as I desired it to be? Why has not this person acted as I told him to, though he is subordinate to me?' and so forth. When a similar condition arises in the weaker, it is called *ava-kroḍha*, resentment, malice, heart-burning, 'How has he spoken thus to me? Why has he treated me like this?'—is the thought in the mind of the man, but he dare not express it because of the superior strength of the other. It remains a *mānasa-kroḍha*, mental anger, only.

When a part, an aspect, of this (emotion of *ava-kroḍha*) appears in one who (otherwise)

is great and strong, it is called *droha*, hatred. Such *droha* always endeavors to mar the success of others, whether greater or smaller and with or without (apparent) *prayojana*, motive, reason. As regards the greater it works thus: 'How may this one be reduced to my condition or a lower one even.' As regards the smaller: 'Let me take steps to make sure that he shall never come up to my condition.' The essence of *droha* is the entire inability of the *jīva* to conceive even for a moment the separability of his I from his 'this' or body.

For purposes of correspondence, anger may be assigned to A, fear to M, hatred to U, and pride to the summation. Hatred is the root of all these; the root of that is *a-jñāna*, ignorance; the root of that again, is the covering up and distortion (*āvaraṇa* and *vikṣhepa*) of true knowledge by desire (for identification with a 'this'); for knowledge seated in or founded on desire, personal selfishness, is *ḍveṣha*. From the empirical standpoint of the world, the defeat of a personal need, necessity or desire, with which the individual self is specially identified and in a manner which is exclusive of and hostile to other individual selves and their

needs—is the immediate cause of anger.¹

The corresponding triplet and summation on the other side are, compassion, reverence, friendliness and *prema* or love generally.

It may be questioned why these emotions should be aroused in us at the sight of the actions, etc., of even those with whom we are not related in any way. It should be ever remembered that the basic principle always is the unity of all selves and the manyness of the sheaths, and that we are revolted by and feel disgust, *ghṛṇā*, (which also means 'pity') by whatever we do not feel our unity with, whatever is not in assonance with our nature; and are, conversely, rejoiced and gladdened by what is like ourselves.

The ethical inference from all the above, to the metaphysical view, is that both *rāga* and *ḍveṣha* should be abandoned and duty done for duty's sake.

Taking the two great classes of emotions as wholes, we may say that *rāga* or love corresponds to A, *ḍveṣha* or hate to U, and what is different from both, indifference, impartiality, equability, justice, to M.

In the above we have seen how action is connected with desire through its two primary forms of love and hate. The manifestation

¹ See *The Science of the Emotions*, (2nd Ed.) p. 32.

of desire is only in and by means of action. It arises out of cognition and in turn gives birth to action. We may now proceed to observe that love and hate arise out of and follow upon each other in an endless rotation. In terms of the Logion, they are 'I-Not-This' and 'This-Not-I'.¹ Yet again, 'I-This-thus' is the expression of *rāga*; also 'This-I-thus'. In these latter, the Negation does not occur, although it occurs in the middle in 'I-Not-This'. The explanation is that Negation has two implications or kinds of meaning: (i) distinction with contradiction, and (ii) distinction with similarity. Thus 'non-human' may mean (i) not man but something like man, as animal, or it may mean (ii) something entirely different from man, as (almost impersonal) god or (almost) inanimate stone. Here, in the second definition of *rāga*, the significance of distinction with similarity is the one conveyed, and it is covered by the 'thus'. On the other hand, in the definition of *ḍveṣha*, as

¹ The absence of verbs and marks of emphasis makes it nearly impossible to assign a precise unmistakable and relevant meaning to each one of these permutations; but the context may help us to make more or less approximate guesses. Thus 'I-Not-This' may mean 'I, and not This,' i.e., 'let the common I prevail and not the separating This,' and so on.

'I-thus-Not-This,' or This-Not-I, the other significance, of distinction with contradiction, is the one that is to the fore. (Briefly, the same words, the same *Sva-bhāva*, includes both aspects inseparably. Emphasise one, we have hate. Emphasise the other, we have love.¹ If hate succeeded in abolishing the 'other' entirely, then itself would perish too for lack of nourishment to live upon. If love identified itself with the other wholly, itself would be lost for lack of body to nourish).

We have just said that love and hate are the two primary forms of desire. For this reason and allied considerations as regards the other factors, it might be urged that it would have been enough to say that 'the marks of the Self are wish, effort and knowledge, *ichchhā*, *prayaṭṇa*, *jñāna*, in other words, the old familiar desire, action and cognition. Why speak of 'desire, aversion, effort, (or volition or conation or exertion), pleasure, pain and cognition,' as the marks? The reply is, because the six constitute the two subdivisions of each of the main three. Thus aversion is the *parivartana*, opposite, of desire; pleasure, of action; and pain, of cognition. But *ḍveṣha* is the opposite of *rāga*, and not of

¹ See the *Viṣṇu-Bhāgavata*, VIII. xix. 38, 39, 40; and *The Science of the Emotions*, 2nd Ed., pp. 57, 58.

ichchhā, of which it is only a sub-division and not a contradiction; and so too as regards the others; why then have not the proper pairs of sub-divisions been mentioned, instead of the main three factors and one sub-division of each (and that too doubtful in the case of two, *viz.*, pleasure as a sub-division of action and pain as one of cognition)? Because it was obviously, absolutely and primarily necessary to mention the three main factors, and only secondarily to speak of any sub-divisions at all, and just to indicate that these sub-divisions and multiplications were in reality endless.¹ The unity of desire is love, hence

¹ This argument may not appear quite convincing at first sight, and what follows may also strike the reader as somewhat far-fetched. But if we translate the author's idea into slightly different language, this may appeal more effectively to us, thus: "To point out the presence of the primal trinity everywhere is the main purpose of this work; to indicate the endless other minor triplets arising out of it, a secondary purpose." As said in an early footnote, sometimes startling substitutions are made by the author, in a normal scheme of triplets, by borrowing 'corresponding terms' from other schemes of triplets, apparently to stimulate the reader's mind. Three triplets seem to be amalgamated here, each corresponding to A U M, respectively,

the mention of desire mentions it. The endlessness of modifications that flows from its opposition, contradiction, disruption into many—that is indicated by the mention of aversion. It is the same as regards exertion and pleasure. It may be said that there is never any pleasure in action, but only labor and trouble, and so pleasure cannot be one of any pair of sub-divisions of action; but this is not so, for it is only by action that the manifestation of anything and everything can take place and, in a sense (*viz.*, that of play and pastime as opposed to work) all such manifestation is pleasurable too. So, again, while the unity of cognition (*viz.*, that continuous cognition is one characteristic of Ātman) is sufficiently covered by the mention of cognition, its endlessness of sub-divisions is indicated by the word 'pain'. Here too, at first sight it appears that only in knowledge is all joy, and all alleviation and abolition of pain; but there is the fact, on the other hand, that the experiencing of opposition, manyness, separateness, is the experiencing of pain; and experiencing is knowing; therefore, knowledge includes pain also. Thus, then, are all these above-mentioned six, properly mentioned

as a whole and also in its factors, *viz.*, cognition, action (effort), desire; impartiality, aversion, attraction; pleasure, pain, peace.

as the marks of the Ātman. As the *Brahma-Sūtra* says: The marks of the Self arise out of definiteness and indefiniteness. Or as the *Sāṅkhya*: All knowledge is the mark of the Self. Or as the *Mīmāṃsā*: Action only is the characteristic of the Self. (Each here, of course, is speaking from a different standpoint).¹

The *Brahma-Sūtra* also says: The *vivardhana*, growth, increase, intensification or expansion of the Self, Ātman, is pleasure; and the *prativardhana*, the decrease, diminution, contraction or decay of it is pain. This may be explained one way, thus, *viz.*, growth or evolution is *kriyā* or action, and that is pleasure. On the other hand, the result of *jñāna*, true knowledge, is the beholding of the existence of Unity and the non-existence of separateness; it is the

¹ The way in which alliances exist between the most distant and even opposite-seeming ideas, and how the mind passes from one thought to another, that everything is related to everything, and no precise, razor-cut, hard and fast and final definition of anything whatsoever is possible—all this must have become abundantly clear to the reader of this work already. The context is but further illustration of this. It may be useful to compare the English expressions, 'knowledge is power' and 'ignorance is bliss,' 'tis folly to be wise,' 'a sadder and a wiser man'. It is all a matter of difference of standpoint.

reduction of multiplicity to unity; and this is the result of decrease or involution, growth in the opposite direction, which decrease is pain; hence also the converse statement that pain is born of knowledge, sadness of wisdom (and *vice versa*, for, as fully discussed elsewhere, wisdom is born of reflexion, and reflexion is aroused only by pain). (This, of course, from one standpoint. From another, true knowledge is the highest happiness because it is the expansion of the small self into identity with the Infinite Self; while action might be said to be painful because it is, perforce, a contraction of the All-Consciousness into dealings with and in the limited).

In reality however,

The Self has no mark, but is Its own mark,
It has no sense of pleasure or of pain,
It has no strenuousness and strife in It,
Nor fear of effort and slow indolence;
No knowledge, true or false, belongs to It,
No lust of hate, no ecstasy of love,
No friendships and no enmities It feels;
Compassion, sympathy, benevolence,
Affection sweet and reverence and faith
Are all unknown to it as much as wrath
And rage and anger, pride and scorn and
fear;
It never breaketh, never maketh peace,

But ever standeth pure Self-centredness,
Unbound, unfreed, blissful and Self-
complete.

Yet, for the Self is seen in many selves,
Give us, Ye Gods ! the love that clasps all
beings,

That willingly, yea eagerly, serves all,
Ever endeavoring to bring joy to each.

No greater service is than this all-service,
No duty greater and no sacrifice ;

It is the sorest t a p a s, self-denial,

It is the greatest d ā n a, charity,

It is the one sole fount of deepest know-
ledge,

To serve all is to serve oneself, the Self.

One's own, one's special, duty is Self-duty,

And this Self-duty is true Selfishness,

For only S v ā r ṭ h a, Selfishness, prevails,

P a r ā r ṭ h a, altruism, and P a r a m ā r ṭ h a

Pure duty, both are naught, both lost
therein.