SECTION III. (Continued.) CHAPTER XXIX. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF KRIYĀ AND PRAŢIKRIYĀ —LOVE AND HATE.

Restatement of basic principles.—The Primal $S \bar{u} \ddagger r \bar{a} \ddagger m \bar{a}$ or Thread of Unity.—Its reflexion into pseudo-infinite threads of individuality.—All the functions of life and operations of the world based on and made possible only by these threads, which hold together all discretes and bring about all the interplay between them.—The interdependence of all, $j \bar{i} v a s$ and $\ddagger a \ddagger \ddagger v a s$.—The necessity of all, from the transcendental standpoint.—The necessity of dealing with one side of a question at a time, from the empirical standpoint.—S $\bar{u} \ddagger r \bar{a} \ddagger m \bar{a} s$ as laws.—The explanation of lawlessness and disorder.—The 'psychological aspects of the thread-soul, (the law of individual being, character, principle, etc.)—R \bar{a} g a and $d v \in s$ ha or Love and Hate.

(Some restatements of the basic principles may be made now in a somewhat new aspect, as a preliminary to the discussions of the emotions which lead to $k r i y \bar{a}$, in the life of individual $j\bar{v}as$.) In the Logion, I-This-Not, what subsists between the I and the This in the nature of interdependence, be it cognition or anything elsethat is the sūțra, the thread. And so also as between I and not, This and not, Not and I, Not and This. This is the original, primal and universal Sūțraor Sūțrāțmā, the Thread-Self. In imitation or reflexion thereof (*i.e.*, of the metaphysical Idea threading the empirical concrete) there arise endless limited sūțrāțmās, thread-souls or group-souls, individualities, graded as higher and lower, which, as stated before, serve as bonds of connexion between world-systems existing side by side with each other in an endless series, and also between the various parts of each world-system, the various organs within each organism.

These threads of individuality, it should be noted, are not only the basis of the appearance of unity. The appearance, the recognition, the operations of separateness and manyness are also possible only within and by means of such $s \bar{u} t r \bar{a} t m \bar{a} s$. (For just as unity is realised against a counterfoil of diversity alone, so diversity cannot be realised except against a background of unity.) Completeness, incompleteness, perfection, imperfection, advice, gift, acceptance, resignation, indifference, expectation, indeed each and all of the conventions of life are possible only within the limits of a concrete limited a n y \bar{a} n y a t v a, other-and-other-ness, which is

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yet based on and is a sameness, a oneness in manyness, identity in difference, similarity in diversity; and such is the sūțrāțmā. Otherwise, each one would be entirely self-absorbed, self-complete, without any commerce with any other. 'You are needed here,' 'I am wanted there,' 'I shall go there,' 'you come here,' 'you have done this,' 'I have not done this' —all such (co-operative and comparative) thinking and acting depends upon the sūțra.

It is true that, sometimes, out of jealousy also, such (apparently dissociative) reflexions arise as that 'I am such and thou art such,' 'I am not like thee,' 'thou art not like me,' etc. But even this is possible only because of the threadsoul. The bhāva, emotion, idea, intention, of īrshyā, jealousy, is this: I have arrived at this very superior condition, and yet this other has also become or is becoming equal to me; he must not pass to a higher status. Or: I have arrived at this state with so much trouble and effort; how shouldst thou, how should another, achieve it also? Or, (in its triumphant aspect): You cannot, how can you, arrive at my heights! In all this, no doubt, there is apparent only an insistence upon separateness. But, looking beneath the surface appearance, we see that the separation is insisted on only within a possibility

of similarity or equality, sameness, oneness. Jealousy arises when the idea of unity is subordinated, and manyness emphasised and exaggerated. Briefly the two are interdependent.

To take another illustration, from the $\ddagger a \ddagger \ddagger v a s$. The work of $\bar{a} k \bar{a} s h a$ is not possible without the presence of $v \bar{a} y u$. $V \bar{a} y u$ is the carrier of sound and without it there would be no hearing, though sound is the quality of $\bar{a} k \bar{a} s h a$. Further, without $\ddagger e j a s$ too the work of both $\bar{a} k \bar{a} s h a$ and $v \bar{a} y u$ would be impossible, for though $v \bar{a} y u$ carries sound, it could not hold it.¹

¹See The Science of Peace, p. 295. Although the expressions, 'one on one,' and 'two on two,' occur in the text later, yet perhaps, in fact, 'three' would be the minimum working number for any 'procession '-as has been said in The Science of Peace, in connexion with the explanation of the word tribhuvanam, the triple-world. For manifestation, a soul, a body and a connecting link of prāņa-force, is the minimum wanted. But if we choose to take up a higher number, in any given cycle, then of course all the component units of that number, being but sub-divisions of the three, must appear in inseparable connexion with each other. So the three dimensions of space are the staple and basis of all calculations. All other and more dimensions can, it would seem, be but 'subdivisions' of these. Speculating as to less than three dimensions leads us to the impasse of 'what about less than one dimension ? '.

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The $dh\bar{a}ran\bar{a}$, holding, of sound would be impossible without tejas. $\bar{A}pas$ and $p r thiv \bar{i}$ are also similarly needed. This illustrates the dependence of $\bar{a}k\bar{a}sha$ on the others. Similarly each and all of the five are equally dependent on each and all of the others out of the five; and one on one, and two on two,

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and three on three, and four on four, and six on six, and seven on seven, and so on *ad infinitum*. All this relation of each with each and all with all is the result of the nature and constitution of the sūțra or thread which is also the niy a ma or law (and the dharma or duty).

Realising this, we have yet, for practical purposes, and for the statement of the chief aspects of any fact, to become $e k a - p \bar{a} k \pm h i k a$, one-sided, *i.e.*, to look at and describe one side at a time.¹ We have already seen this in reference to existence and non-existence, which two always occur in succession in practice, though simultaneous in the primal theory of the Logion; so that the existence of anything is always

¹ 'Every question has two sides,' and only one can be stated at a time. In the words of the Yoga-Väsishtha, 'speech is successive'. Even such statement, of one side at a time, such inequilibrium, is the pendulum-swing of the World-process held within the clock-case of the Absolute, the to-andfro rushing of the Prakrti aspect of the Absolute, confined within the circling of the Purusha-aspect. preceded as well as succeeded by its non-existence, and the non-existence of anything is also similarly inevitably preceded and succeeded by its existence.

The statement of the particular order of the succession of such aspects, one aspect at a time, in particular circumstances—is the statement of the sūțra or niyama, thread or law, theory or rule of practice. And this too is the essential significance of nirnaya, judgment or determination (as it is called in the $Ny\bar{a}ya$ system), *i.e.*, the determination of the particular order (or succession of events, which is the main feature of causation, which in turn is the main object of ratiocination, relationing) that prevails in particular circumstances.¹ Otherwise, indeed, (we know once for all that) all things *are*, and so determination were meaningless and fruitless trouble.

Herein also lies the secret of the activity of knowledge, jñāna-kriyā, for it is the inherent unity of all jīvas amidst the diversity of their upādhis that compels each one to impart to others the knowledge that it acquires.

¹ This is 'logic' viewed in subordination to 'metaphysic'. Thus only is it saved from sterility, and becomes statesmanlike and effective for practical application and use: "This is the rule to follow and to believe in—in such and such given circumstances—not always absolutely".

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But disease which arises out of disorder, breach of law, goes against the universal presence and prevalence of the order implied in and by the sūțra or thread-soul? The reply is obvious. When the diversity which is threaded together by the law into the unity which makes up and governs the organic constitution of a jīva's sheath or organism (be it an atomic animalcule or a solar system) for the time being, becomes over-accentuated and dominant, then there is the appearance of disease. The restoration of the balance, the reestablishment of the supremacy of the unity, is the remedy (physically and mentally).¹ Such is the basic aphorism of the Science of Medicine.

The 'connective-tissue' nature of the sutratma being thus premised, we find that in its embodiment in a $j \bar{\imath} v \bar{a} t m \bar{a}$, it manifests, as the Nyāya aphorism says, i c h c h h ā or desire (in the sense of rāga, attraction), $d v e \bar{\imath} h a$ or aversion, prayatna or volitional effort or activity, sukha or pleasure, d u h k h a or pain, and

¹ Physically, the restoration of the sway of the one vital mukhya-prāņa, over the clamorous, selfseeking minor tendencies, each 'fighting for its own hand'. Mentally, the restoration of one-pointedness to a single purpose over the sickening worries of conflicting motives and passions. Cf. E. Carpenter: *Civilisation, Its Cause and Cure.* jñāna or cognition. The wish to be, to enjoy, to do, is manifest all around. So also is aversion.

Hate is the realisation of Manyness, separateness. It says: I am such; and such my rival, my enemy, is not, and he must not be allowed to become such and similar. Note here that the *existence* of the opposing foe also is an organic part of the one, without which the latter would not realise its own existence, (on the general principle that everything carries its opposite within itself.)

Rāga, love, on the other hand, is the Self Itself. Hence, indeed, it is not named expressly in the aphorism, side by side with i ch ch hā, dve sha, etc.¹ The form of rāga is this : As I am, so is this self. Why and how should there

¹ It may be asked why rāg a and dve sha are not regarded here as the two sub-divisions of ichchhā, why the whole of ichchhā is put beside a part of itself viz., dve sha; and why prayatna and jñān a are not also stated in pairs like pleasure and pain. The Nyāya aphorism quoted in the text is current in the extant Nyāya-Sāţra also. Difference of standpoint and immediate purpose would probably be the explanation. In pairs, we would have pleasure and pain, knowledge and error, love and hate, action and re-action, (for activity and laziness, prayațna and shāițhilya.) The matter is discussed in the text itself later.

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be any difference of onewise and otherwise? As I am, so is this whole world. All are similar, all are equal, and all are verily the same. There is no difference, no opposition anywhere, no separateness of any kind. The One Self is present in all. How shall this one suffer pain, when I am happy? How may he become painless and happy also?

This rāga is the source of sympathy and sorrow for others who may be in a condition worse than our own; of joy for others in a condition equally good with ours. Sneha, prīți, prema, etc., are all variations of it.¹ It becomes dayā, compassion, pity, towards those to whom we are shreşhtha, superior. Looking with the eye of rāga, the jīva thinks: Alas! how is it that this one is laghu, inferior to me, smaller than I am, though he is a living being like me? He is wanting in such and such things; I have got them; let me give these to him, so that he may become equal to me. When in that particular mood of rāga which is called

¹ Current use of these Samskrt words is not sufficiently discriminate to make one feel sure about English equivalents. The text gives its own interpretations of some of these words later on. As to the most important forms of rāga—to superiors, to equals, to inferiors, see Yoga-Sūtra, I. 33; Vishņu-Bhāgavata, IV. viii. 34; and The Science of the Emotions. $day \bar{a}$, benevolence or pity, the $j\bar{\imath}va$ thinks particularly of the condition of his inferiors, of the causes of their inferiority, of their consequent unhappiness, and of the means of remedying these. Such compassion asks: How are you? Why so sad? What can I do to help you? Is not the Self the same in us both? You are I and I am you. Tell me all your troubles. I will do all I can to remove it, etc.

The reason underlying the invitation and gathering together of relatives and friends on all occasions of samskāras, sacraments and ceremonies, occasions of joy and sorrow, is this same, viz., that they may be able to help each other and fulfil one another's needs and realise the Common Self in more than usual measure. Why only relatives and friends? Because, though, truly, all have the right to demand and receive help from all, yet, for practical purposes, within the regions of the limited, it is not possible for all to gather in a limited space and time, and therefore convention restricts such gatherings to friends and relatives, etc. Because the Self is one in all, therefore one I calls upon or invites another. That there is one I and another I is due to the manyness of the sheaths. Because of this is it possible for one I to learn of, and fulfil, the needs of another I. Only the I can

thereby. Why is this? When a jīva regards himself as exclusive of or separate from others, when the element of manyness is prominent and the oppositions that are born in the many out of the many from the very fact and multiplication of the manyness-then such is the necessary consequence. Then one jīva suffers pain at another's gain : Why has this one obtained this thing that I have not gained ? This feeling of pain may occur even when the person (feeling it) feels himself superior to the other with the self-complacence of jealousy. A common instance is the case of marriage where the parents of the bride sadden to lose their daughter and the parents of the bridegroom rejoice to gain a daughter-in-law.

Such regrets and sorrows (and joys, etc.) are to be recognised as facts, and regarded as more or less justifiable, only as temporary moods in and of the limited. Otherwise, from the standpoint of the transcendental, there is no room for such. And (even for practical purposes) as the *Brahma-Sūțra* says: P r a y a ț n a or effort, exertion, one's best endeavor, is the (only proper) function of the individual j ī v a. Action should be undertaken without consideration of consequences (*i.e.*, whether they will be pleasurable or painful to the actor; it is enough that he exerts

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know of the wants of the I. This is the reason of the grieving of the elder over the loss by death or otherwise of a younger. He thinks, on the one hand, from the standpoint of the world: The lost one was younger than I; he was my relative; he would have carried on my work, etc. On the other hand, he feels, from the standpoint of the Self: It was my duty to educate him, to bring him up to my own level; I have failed herein, etc. The cause of joy at the birth or marriage of a younger is similar : He will carry on my work of the multiplication of the one into the many (the work of selfexpansion which is the essence of joy); he will make new brahmāndas. The One Universal Necessity alone appears in all the endless forms of the particular needs and wishes, the prayojana, the moving, inducing, compelling purpose, of all these particular circumstances. It is called by the name of prayojana when delimited by time. From such a point of time to such another, such a one can help on the prayojana of such another one.

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In the preceding paragraphs we have observed the workings of $r \bar{a} g a$. We see, on the other hand, that it also happens that when one is pleased another is pained by that fact, and, *vice versā*, when one is pained another is pleased 63

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his utmost to discharge his duty). The counsel that consequences should be carefully pondered before action is undertaken, refers to the limitations in time, from the standpoint of the 'bound,' *i.e.*, the $j \bar{\imath} v a s$ not yet 'liberated '.'

¹ In other words, consequences to others who are not 'liberated' but are on the Path of Pursuit and are moved by motives of worldly pleasures and pains, should be carefully considered by those who, having passed on to the Path of Renunciation, no longer care for consequences to themselves.