SECTION III. (Continued.) CHAPTER XVIII.

THE PENULTIMATES.

Prațyagāțmā.—Its characteristics.—Mūla-prakṛṭi.—Its distinguishing features.—The explanation of its presence.—The meaning of illusion.—Jīvāṭmā.—Its definition.—The Nexus, Relation, of Niṣheḍha or Negation, between Self and Not-Self.—Its functions.—Daivī-prakṛṭi, causal energy.—Its nature and aspects.—Distinctions of aspects of the Self and the other Penultimates.

Pratyagāṭmā dwells in A. Mūla-prakrṭi resides in U. Daivī-prakṛṭi, Shakṭi, 'Divine Nature,' 'Might,' 'Ability,' Necessity, Power, Force, Energy, lives hidden in (the letter) "I" merged and invisible in the coalescence of A and U. In M lies the appearance of separateness between these three, and the negation of that separateness by their mutual conflict and abolition; it is that which is different from them all, yet includes them all, Self-determined, sorrowless, conditionless.¹

(i.) Prațyagățmă.

Whatever is the content, the connotation, the significance of the I alone, pure and simple, without any limitation of 'this,' or 'thus,' or otherwise—this pure consciousness or awareness or knowledge is Pratyagātmā. Sarvam prați añchați, 'that which goes and reaches out to, towards or into, which pervades and attracts, all'-that is pratyak. The ā t mā, the Self, which is behind and within this activity of reaching the unreached, this all-pervasion, which is the originating source and establishing maintainer of this incessant operation—that is Pratyagātmā. As the Brahma-sūtra says: The consciousness or knowledge of the Self alone is the consciousness or knowledge of Pratyagātmā. Or as the Sānkhya declares: The form, the nature, of the I is immediate, unscreened, eternal. Or the Nyāya: The Pratyagātmā perisheth and decayeth never, nor is it proved, accomplished or perfected by apavarga, liberation. and universal principle of M, is Shiva whose

and universal principle of M, is Shiva whose characteristics are described in these same words in the *Purāṇas*. He is the Lord of, and impartially helps both, the gods and the titans, the forces of good and of ill; He is the chief of the immortals, yet carries venom in His throat; and so on.

¹This may serve as an illustration of what was

¹In understanding this, it may be of help to remember that the particular and individual manifestation, in a world-system, of this metaphysical

It is true that the I never stands apart from the This, at any time, yet it is distinguishable from the latter as pervading it. That the two are so distinguishable is shown by the mere fact that there are two words for them. Both are mutually dependent, each defines the other, and they cannot be separated from each other. The individualisation of the I is the 'this,' and into and by the 'this'; otherwise it has no particular and manifested existence. So the individuality of the 'this' is,

said in the note at the end of the preceding chapter. The Samskṛṭ word is siddha, which means all that the three English words convey, and a little careful examination will show that the same common skeleton-idea runs through and becomes transformed into the three different-seeming ideas signified by the three words, by means and because of new applications, associations, situations and surroundings.

It may seem to the reader that certain basic facts and principles are repeated too often, almost ad nauseam perhaps, by Gārgyāyaṇa. But what is the very object of metaphysic? Is it not to trace all facts to one principle? If, so, then it is necessary again and again to return to, and start afresh in a new direction from, that principle, otherwise it will be forgotten and the reader will begin to see contradictions where there are none.

and is because of a ham, I. In the totality, of course, I, This and Not are as one; that which the I is, that same is Not-This; that which the This is, that same is Not-I; that which the Not is, that same is I-This, i.e., the identification of I and This is Not, is false, (illusory), or, in other words, the Not is Not-I-This. Thus, then, whatever, and wheresoever, appears in the World-process as the mere I, characterised by the quality of the thread of unity, that is the appearance, the form, the nature, the being of Pratyagatma.

(ii.) Müla-Prakrtı.

The Etat, the This, which is the locus, the seat of manifestation of the I, is the Not-I. the An-ātmā, Mūla-prakṛṭi. We are now considering the This alone, purely, by itself, as the absence, the opposite, the counterfoil of the I. Such is Mūla-prakṛti. Its essential form and nature is 'This-ness,' objectivity, the cause and means of all manifestation. The possibility of the atom-many is here; for E ta t is essentially many. It is true that a unity is ascribed to or at least suggested of Etat too by the Self's Negation of the Many, by the Negation of it as a 'single totality' opposed to, yet by that very fact also mirroring, the Self's Unity. The Self declares eternally that Manyness altogether is not. Still.

even the mere juxtaposition of the I and the This itself gives rise to a duality. And duality is a denial of unity; it is manyness; it is the opposite of the One. Hence is Mūla-prakṛṭi inevitably and pseudo-infinitely atomic, ever more and more infinitesimal. This inmost nature of Mūla-prakṛṭi as the This, should be carefully realised within oneself. That which makes, shows forth, manifests, karoṭi, in the highest, most extensive, most long-drawn-out manner, prakarṣheṇa, what is the root, the source and origin, mūla, of everything, viz., Praṭyagāṭmā—that is Mūla-prakṛṭi.

As has been declared elsewhere: Not-Selfness is Mūla-prakṛṭi. The Brahma-sūṭra says: The very nature of Mūla-prakṛṭi is the opposite of the Self; it is the Not-Self. The Nyāya: The Not-Self displays and embodies all that is the opposite of the Self. By the conjunction of the two, Praṭyagāṭmā and Mūla-prakṛṭi, there is born into manifestation all that 'appears'. "The world appears by light and darkness," as the common saying goes. Mūla-prakṛṭi corresponds to darkness; Praṭyagāṭmā to light. When the Self is seated in the Not-Self, then only is there evolution, not by either alone.

It is true that, in a sense, there cannot be any

opposition between the Self and the Not-Self, for they are both included in the Being of the Absolute, still in the actual business of the world they work interdependently, which compels the supposition, the assumption, of a difference, an opposition, between them. It is not opposition in the ordinary sense however, but a matter of necessity. The positing thereof is necessary. Were the two opposed in the ordinary sense, their mutual relativity, reciprocity, interdependence, were not possible. That which cannot perform its work, cannot achieve its object, independently of another, cannot be said to be really opposed to that other. A complete opposition in the ordinary sense would require complete independence, self-dependence. It may be said that the I is declared to be essentially self-dependent. No doubt, this is so. But when the I becomes qualified and characterised as the actor and has, as its very nature, to perform the work of 'becoming,' then its selfdependence becomes hidden, latent. It is obvious and patently predicable of the I only when the I is considered in itself, apart from the This and the Not. With reference to them, the I is also other-dependent. The This, on the other hand, is essentially and every way otherdependent. Being inseparate from the I, however, and therefore catching a reflexion of the nature of the I, it puts on the appearance of being and may be also called self-dependent. When joined to and permeated by the I, it has the appearance of unity. Thus, then, the appearance of the opposite of oneness is the Not-Self, Mūla-prakṛṭi.

Again, in itself, this Not-Self has the condition, the essential nature, character and being of Non-being. This is its proprium when the I posits it face to face with Itself as the opposite of Itself and therefore negates it as impossible. Non-being and Never is the opposite of the I, which is the essence and the whole of Ever-Being, which is the only Being that we are aware of. But even in the op-position there is the positing of the Not-I by the I. An positing is supposing, giving of possibility. Out of this fact the Not-Self steals an ever-transient ex-istence. The I is unlimited by Time, Space and Substance (i.e., Motion, for substance is realised by motion, manifests and exists in and by movement only). But these are dependent upon the I; they are all as a t, non-being, non-existent, essentially; and they are the whole stock-in-trade of Mula-prakṛṭi. Thus is This both saṭ and as at, being and non-being, an appearance of existence on a core of non-existence.

When we think of the opposition between the I and the This, the latter may appear as

something separate, but in reality they are always threaded together. As the science of grammar says, naming is impossible without duality. For naming is distinguishing, and distinguishing is of one from another. If there were only unity, speech would not be at all. Light is 'illumined' itself, in turn, is thrown into relief, made manifest, by darkness. Without darkness, light could not be even spoken of. So Mūlaprakṛṭi throws into relief Praṭyagāṭmā immanent in it. It is called the playmate of the Self. It is the other of its other. It is ananța, endless, pseudo-infinite, connected with and including every particular thing. All action or motion takes place herein. All Shilpashāstra, all physical art and science, is devoted to it.

The identity of I and This, it is obvious, is eternally denied. The two can never and ought never to exist simultaneously. Yet, the awareness, the consciousness, of the non-existence of the This during the existence of the I, is itself the possibility and the postulation of that This. 'I is'—this consciousness implies and includes the consciousness 'there is nothing else, other-than-I'. This (second) idea, prabodha, constitutes opposition—and the result thereof is manifest manyness. That factor, condition or moment of the Partless, Unconditioned,

Timeless, Absolute Consciousness in and out of which this notion of separateness, of something other than I, arises—that is Mūla-prakṛţi. We may take an illustration: Suppose that one individual is the sole monarch of the entire globe of the earth, chakravarti, imperator over all. But even when this fact is recognised without dispute, even then the statement is made, "There is no other," or the question put, "Is there really no other?" The autocrat also reflects from time to time, "Is there any ruler other than and independent of me, or is there not?" Such thought, implying doubts, involves the possibility of, and forthwith creates,1 the opposite of the oneness. For if there were no such possibility at all, then the statements, discussions, questions and reflexions would all be truly and literally useless and meaningless. And such useless and meaningless actions never take place in the world, for the reason that the I is the only actor and its actions imitate its nature of Truth and Being; or, again, because

everything is by necessity, and what is necessary is useful and significant. In the reflexions of the monarch of our illustration there will further occur such comparisons as these, "such and such others are like me; but they are less than I am in these respects; they have not such a power, or qualification, or function; they are therefore not quite like me, not equal to me," and so forth. The I is the supreme sovereign of the illustration. The domain of his sovereignty is the This. His reflexions are all concerned with it and are of two sorts, both of the nature of doubt, 'Is it' or 'Is it not?' Like the monarch, the I ponders whether another than itself has or has not existence. The supposition or im-position, upon or within its consciousness, of such hypotheses is the creation of manyness (though only for subsequent refutation). In reality there is no difference,

¹ In the illustration, history shows that very autocratic rulers do 'create' very independent and rebellious subjects who start independent governments, to be again gathered up later on in a higher federation—a reflexion in concrete human affairs of the laws and principles of metaphysical psychology. (See *The Science of the Emotions*, ix.)

¹ Treated in the third person, 'Is there anything else than the Self?' the problem becomes a little more distant, more difficult to solve, than when put in the first person, 'Am I anything other than I?' One way of dealing with the problem in the third person is this: Apparently there is an infinity of things other than myself around me—but, how do I know that there really is? My senses, eyes, ears, etc., prove their existence? But what proves the existence of these senses? Ultimately, my own knowledge, my consciousness, is the sole and solitary

no separateness, between the monarch and his domain; for the notion of the one includes the notion of the other. The vishaya, object, domain, field of life and activity, is included in the being of the subject. Subject and object are not apart. In this sense, there is no opposition between I and This. The notion of the This is in the I. And the notion is the notion of not-one, of many individuals. This manyness of samsāra is mithyā-pra-pañcha, 'mythical quintuplication,' a false, an illusory, complexity and multiplicity. Herein Etat is an-a-bhinna, 'not-un-separate from Aham (I=not not-I), neither separate nor nonseparate. Hence is the world said to be based in unity but qualified with and manifesting in duality.

Mithyā, false, is that which is both sat and a-sat, being and non-being. I is sat; This is a sat; the conjunction of the two is the World-process.

proof and guarantee to me of the existence of my senses as well as of all sense-objects, and, in the circumstances, not only the proof, but the sole support, originator, substratum of them. Hence whatever existence they have is derived from me and is not independent of and apart from me. See The Science of Peace, p. 143, and chapters viii. to xi. for a detailed exposition of the basic metaphysical principles touched on in the text.

The One Āṭmā, in the Many Eṭaṭ, appears as many; then it is called jīvāṭmā.

(iii.) THE NEXUS OF NISHEDHA OR NEGATION.

The Nexus between the two, viz., the Not or Negation, indicates their non-contradiction of unity.1 The consciousness of this very noncontradiction of unity by the two, i.e., the completed negation of manyness by oneness, in any one system, the mergence of the two into one, (or one another, or each other) is pralaya. For this reason, in the consciousness of pure unity there is nothing to speak of, no speaker, no word, no space, no time, no action, and no action lessness. The form or nature of unity is different from all these things, which have place only with reference to its opposite, the many. Where there is no many, no separateness, there no language is possible. Hence the Nexus between I and This is of the nature of Negation.

Brahman is not prāṇa, apāna, etc., (the five vital energies that link and hold together the constituents of the body and so are the reflexions of the supreme Energy of Negation); It is not ākāsha, etc., (the five known kinds of 'this,' the elements); It is not (any of the endless derivatives of these and their mutual

¹ Gārgyāyana's language hereabouts is very compressed and obscure. I have here and there purposely retained the mannerisms of the original.

relations) food or plant or suffering or revolt therefrom, or junction or division, or knowledge or action, or I and thou and he and another, and so on. No-thing is Brahman. All this, this, this, etc., is contradiction of the unity of I and This; and such absence of unity cannot be spoken of as Brahman; it is only a part (and not the Whole.) On the other hand, the unity of the two (where the I has negated and abolished the This, and so abolished itself, for practical purposes of manifestation) is Brahman; for therein is no-distinction—well-described as I-This-Not. Brahman is neither A, nor U, nor M; It is the identity, the mutual mergence, the disappearance of A and U in M.

It may be asked why this opposition, this contradiction of unity, this manyness appears much more prominently than unity. The reply is obvious: Appears means manifests, and manifestation is by multiplicity. Appearance, manifestation, prominence and diversity are synonymous. Even the words 'more' and 'less' belong to the many; their significance is nothing else than 'more distinguishable, more separated off' and 'less so'. In either case, that of 'more' or that of 'less,' there is a contradiction of the Whole, the Oneness. As the $Ny\bar{a}ya$ says: The opposite of the Whole is a part, and the synthesis, the non-opposition, the

unity (and mutual abolition) of all the parts is the Whole.

While, then, manyness is prominent and manifest, Unity must obviously be the reverse. As 'separateness' increases in a world-system, 'unity' retires more and more into concealment. The words 'extreme' etc., are now and then used to qualify and describe 'separateness'. They have always only a comparative sense, indicating graded degree, and never can have an absolute meaning. 'Extreme opposition' means only very great and much emphasised difference; 'opposition,' only ordinary difference; 'non-opposition,' slight difference.

The scriptural text, "May I, the One, become many, may I be born forth," should be interpreted accordingly. The One I thinks to and within Itself, "Am I alone, or is there anyone else also". And this very thought, implying their possibility, creates the actual appearance of many others (for to that substrate-Consciousness, possibility is equivalent to 'actual appearance'). The cause and condition and means of the final determination, 'I alone is or am,' is the ex-istence, the possibility, the false appearance, the im-position and palming off on or in the Consciousness, of 'many-others'. It is only after the possibility and then the impossibility of 'others' has been

examined and ascertained, that the proclamation can be made, 'I alone am'.

(iv.) Paivī-Prakṛṭi.

The Necessity of the contradiction of the unity of I and This is Paivī-Prakṛṭi. It is symbolised by g, the letter I, dwelling between A and U. When two things are based on or rooted in one, difference between them is also a matter of necessity. The unnecessary is non-existent. What exists is necessary. All Becoming is necessary. This Energy of virodha, contradiction, opposition, is Daivī-Prakṛṭi. In it I and This manifest. In one view, Mülaprakrtimay be said to dwell within Daivīprakrti and Pratyagāţmā within Mūlaprakrti. It is the Energy of the necessity of both. That by means of which illumination, irradiation, play, takes place, dīvyaţe anayā, that is daivī. Prakṛṭi is sva-bhāva; becoming, causing to be, bhāvanam, by one's own effort, sva-vatnena-this is svabhāva; it is doing or acting, pra-karaņam, naturans, by one's self. And the action of all and everything is the action of the Self.

The Energy of the conjunction or combination, yoga, of I and This, is Yoga-Māyā. As the Yoga-sūṭra says: There is an appearance of conjunction between subject and object as between light and darkness. The necessity of

the manifestation of opposition between them, on the other hand, is Māyā. That which lights up and throws into relief both I and This, and is inside of and immanent in both is Paivī-Prakṛṭi. In its transcendent and universal aspect it is Māyā. In a description of the World-process, as the necessity of the contradiction of the unity of I and This, it is Paivī-Prakṛṭi.

The reason why Paivī and Mūla are both called Prakṛṭi is that the former has the appearance of being nearer to the latter than to the Self. In one sense, indeed, it may be said that it is peculiarly the Necessity of This; that the Necessity of I is 'another,' anyaṭ; Prakṛṭi, (aparā?); and that of Negation, still 'another' anyaṭ (Parā?). In reality, Prakṛṭi is necessity, of nature, character, being. Everything acts, behaves, happens of itself, because of the essential necessity of its nature, in the deepest sense.

Both these Prakṛṭis, Paivī and Mūla belong to the Āṭmā, which is ever Self-determined. That which is different from the Āṭmā, is its non-existence, Not-I, and it is born of the necessity of the nature of the I itself; but as the product is This, that necessity may also be called the necessity of This. Differences of names naturally arise out of differences of

situation. In its transcendental aspect, Mülaprakṛţi is Anāţmā; in a limited samsāra, it is Mūla-prakrti; in a brahmānda, Aparā-prakṛţi. So, the universal and transcendent aspect is Māyā; that shown in a samsāra, Paivī-prakṛţi; that in a brahmānda, Parā-prakṛţi. So, the all-transcendent aspect of the Self is called Ațmā, pure and simple; in contradistinction from and with a comparative reference to limitations, to upādhi-sheathed selves, it is the Paramātmā, or Supreme Self; with reference to the network of laws, the warp and woof of regulation and administration, it is the Sūtrātmā; as pervading all activity, it is Pratyagātmā; as experiencing that activity, it is jīvāt mā; and so on endlessly.1

In reality, however, there is no separateness, no difference, no distinctions:

Not other, nor un-other, neither far, Nor near, nor yet Root-Nature, nor Divine, Not atomed Matter, nor Necessity, Nor Energy of Being or Non-being, Not Māyā and not Yoga-māyā too, Not Might, nor Wish, nor All-pervading Self, Nor Self drawn into or from All, nor Pure, Nor Not-Self, nor Embodied, nor Supreme, Nor the World-process, nor transcending it, Nor any one World-system, one brahmand', One jagat, vishva, or one mahā-vishva, Loka or mahā-lok' of endless grading, Nor same, nor different, separate or one, Nor time, nor space, nor substance infinite, Nor pure, nor full of stains, nor One nor Many-

But All at once, ever and everywhere, An ever Restless Rest of I-This-Not.

text not perplexing but most suggestive and illuminating. Some of the technical words mentioned in the text here are explained at length in subsequent chapters, in new aspects.

¹The reader may be reminded here of the necessity of "pursuing the thought through the word" and not allowing himself to be perplexed by the same word being apparently used in different senses. If he has at all touched the truths that everything is everywhere and always, that different situations bring out different aspects of one and the same thing, like the ever new forms assumed by the same few pieces of colored glass in a kaleidoscope, that the same names indicate principles as well as particular individuals, officers, hierarchs concretely embodying those principles—then he will find the