

## SECTION III. (Continued.)

## CHAPTER XIII.

## THE VEDĀNGAS.

The *Āṅgas* or 'limbs' of the *Veḍas*.—Their proper order in nature and for study.

We have seen how these six, the *Veḍas*, the *Brāhmaṇas*, the *Upaniṣats*, the *Upa-Veḍas* and the *Kṛṣṇa* and *Shukla Shākhās* together with their summation, the seventh (*viz.*, the Science of the *Pranava*), respectively connected with cognition, desire and action in their duplicate(?) combinations and in their summation, are all inherent in the transcendental AUM, and, in their totality, constitute the entire ideation of the World-process, the principles underlying its methods and the laws under which it is carried on. In their totality they constitute the Sanātana Dharma, and are the proper study of the first portion of life. All other work should be entered on after they have been mastered, for with knowledge of them all else may be accomplished.

Now, that whereby or with the help of which the full knowledge of these may be secured is known as the *Āṅga*, the limb, the instrumental

organ, the subsidiary or subservient science. As the *Brahma-Sūtra* says: That by means of which something is accomplished is an *āṅga* thereof. It is true that it has also been declared that there is no difference or separateness between the end and the means; but this is true only from the transcendental standpoint, while for practical purposes they are distinguishable. Therefore, though the *Veḍas* constitute the whole ideation of the whole *samsāra* and there is nothing left outside of them, still, the method and means of interpreting and understanding them may be regarded as separate from them, as one organ from a whole organism. An organism is not different from the organs of which it is made up, yet 'organ' and 'organism' have a meaning only when we think of the organism as a collective whole *possessing* parts, and of each of the latter as *belonging* to the former.<sup>1</sup> Neither has any

<sup>1</sup>This is one of the endless illustrations of the vital importance of the distinction between the 'transcendental' and the 'empirical, experiential or practical' standpoint. The World-process as a *Universal Whole* is absolutely nothing else than the summation of all its parts (which, by the way, abolish each other, and in the summation, leave behind only the Absolute Vacuum-Plenum, the I—Not-I—Not). But any *particular* aggregate, an organism, an individual, while composed of parts, is yet

sense by itself, without reference to the other, yet, or, rather, for that very reason, the two are distinguishable from each other. But in the performance of action the two must necessarily be together, as one. This is all the significance of a collective whole, an aggregate; and the whole World-process is but such

also something else than the parts. An animal deprived of one or more limbs or organs, still remains that animal. "The tendency to materialise psychic things," deprecated by many people, (*vide*, for an illustration at random, p. 230 of *Mind*, for April 1906) corresponds to a fact in nature. 'An organism,' 'an individual,' 'a species,' 'a type,' is a psychic idea, but *because it means* an aggregate of 'organs,' 'parts,' 'singulars,' 'particulars,' *therefore*, in order that there may be some reason, some explanation, for its coming into contact with the latter at all, it also takes on, by *adhya*ropa, superimposition, *some* characteristic of the latter and *becomes* material; it becomes an 'animating principle,' a 'soul or subtle body,' a 'group-soul,' an 'independently-existing archetype' etc., in an endless series of plane within plane and world within world and body within body. Indeed, the whole of the manifest World-process is an attempt, an incessant and ever-unsuccessful attempt, to *materialise* the *transcendental* Idea of the Self, to *embody* and define in terms of matter (for there is no other way of defining), that which is ever 'Not-Matter'. (See *The Science of Peace*, pp. 131, 143.)

a collection. Each depends upon all and all on each; there is not any one thing that is really independent of any other thing. On this same principle the *Vedas* need the *Āngas*.

These *Āngas* expound the order and arrangement of the whole *Veda* and so help the understanding thereof; for so long as the successive order of any investigation, the history of any development of knowledge regarding any subject, is not known, that subject is not perfectly understood. It is true that, generally, the whole is first sighted in the mass, in outline, in a bird's-eye view; but, thereafter, the parts have to be examined in succession if fuller knowledge is desired, and hence there is always a *succession* in every study. In this same way is the knowledge (of the main truth) of the whole World-process acquired, and the *Vedas* have to be studied in accordance with this principle.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>This paragraph embodies the principles and theory of pedagogy. The modern educationist's difficulty, 'general education first or specialisation,' is solved here by combining both. As usual, the truth lies in the *via media* which accepts both sides of every question and endeavors to combine both in a workable compromise. But in times and places when extremes prevail violently and men's minds are dominated by the Egoistic intelligence, and passions are strong and the lower form of

The *Veda* corresponds to A; the *Āṅga* to U; the essence of both (the *Upāṅga*) to M; the *Praṇava* is the summation of all.

We have seen that the *Veda* sub-divides into six classes, *Samhitā*, *Brāhmaṇa*, *Upāniṣat*, *Tantra*, *Kṛṣṇa-Yantra*, and *Shukla-Yantra*, by the permutations of cognition and action (with desire). And, accordingly, the *Āṅgas* are also six, as declared in the injunction: Know Brahman by the six *Āṅgas*. These are: *Shikṣā*, *Kalpa*, *Vyākaraṇa*, *Nirukta*, *Chhandah*, and *Jyotiṣha*. But the order in which they are usually studied, with reference to their comparative practical importance, is: *Vyākaraṇa*, *Shikṣā*, *Kalpa*, *Chhandah*, *Nirukta* and *Jyotiṣha*. It should be remembered however that there is no really fixed or essential order amongst them.

(i) *Vyākaraṇa* or Grammar, literally, 'spreading out, displaying, evolving'.—Relation between grammar and language.—The significance of language, expression of desire.—The significance of grammar, effective use of language.—Reasons for the study  
democracy is rampant because of the degeneration of true aristocracy, and saṅkara, mixture, confusion, adulteration of all castes, classes, rights and duties rules the day, and maryādā, wise conventions and limitations of self-indulgence, are broken through, then and there such reconciliation is difficult.

of grammar.—High and low tones, and forms and colors of sounds.—Mutual relations of the root-elements.—Relation between sound and ākāśha.—The genesis of language.—The Samskr̥t.—Endless kinds and divisions of language, according to different planes of matter, and different regions within each plane.—Dialects.—Cause of change.—Shiva, the author of the primal work on grammar.—The genesis of the alphabet.—The reason for the order thereof.—Words.—Their main classes or parts of speech, nouns, verbs and prepositional terminations, corresponding to A, U, and M.—Sub-divisions under each.—The transcendence of all language by the Absolute.

*Vyākaraṇa* is regarded as the most useful of all the means to the study of the *Vedas*, because it pervades the other means or *Āṅgas* and is the only means of understanding *them*. That whereby (all words) are 'uttered,' vyākriyanṭe, analysed, formulated, manifested, evolved, or derived, that is *Vyākaraṇa*. This science collects together all expressive sounds or words, analyses and expounds them, teaches their 'behaviour' and use, and their derivation or origin and etymology generally; also the necessity of every word or sound and the necessity of its use.

A preliminary discussion may be disposed of here. Grammar is said to be the means and language the end. Everyone knows that

grammar is of and from language. Thus, it has been said: All the verbal activity that there is in the wide world—for its proper understanding was grammar constructed; by the study of this science of language is the essence of the truth about sound understood, and through knowledge of *Shabda-Brahman* man becometh *Brahman*.<sup>1</sup> Now, generally speaking,

<sup>1</sup> *Brahman*, as pointed out in a previous note, means, etymologically, the great, the large and that which has the potency of expansion. In other words, it means the eternal, the Infinite, and also the Principle of infinite multiplication and expansion in the realm of the limited. This potency and principle is present in every kind and form of piece of matter, yet, at our stage of evolution and to us, it is most observable in the seed of life which reproduces the ancestral or parental form infinitely, and in the seed or power or faculty of sound and language which reproduces thought infinitely. Therefore we have the expression *Shabda-Brahman* used prominently. In the word *brahmacharya* the idea of securing, storing up *Brahman*, in all its senses (the principle and potency of reproducing and multiplying the physical as well as the mental or psychical life infinitely) is implied. Now and then we meet with *anna-Brahman*, food-grain, or *Pancha-Brahman* (five forms of Shiva, meaning, one way, the five *ṭaṭṭvas*) etc. *Shabda-Brahman* has thus come to mean both 'sound' in the general or

that to which another belongs precedes, and that which belongs to another succeeds; therefore grammar should be subsequent to language. Yet, so peculiar is the relation between language and grammar that most people think that the latter precedes and the former succeeds; for, without grammar, language cannot be used correctly or words put one after another in their appropriate places. Those who do not know discriminatingly what language is or what grammar is, even they know that such and such a word conveys such and such a meaning, that this or this word should be employed in such or such a reference. From all this it may well be inferred that grammar precedes language

abstract sense, *shabda-sāmānya*, the same as AUM, (*vide* Shaṅkara's *Māndūkya Bhāṣhya*) and also all the *forms* of sound, especially articulate, which embody thought. This last sense, that of the whole mass of knowledge, enshrined in words, which has to be passed through by the *jīva*, before it realises the Formless *Brahman*, is the one meant in the text here. Another form of the same thought is expressed in the common Vedānta-saying, *viz.*, by study of the *shāstras* or books, one obtains *parokṣha-jñāna*, indirect or *word-knowledge*, *Shabda-Brahman*; then by inner meditation, one obtains *aparokṣha-jñāna*, direct cognition or realisation of *Brahman*. Compare the expression "vital and *spermatic* books" in Emerson's *Books*.

age. It is true that the *name* *vyākaraṇa* is a consequent of language, but the *thing* named is precedent.<sup>1</sup> That which pre-exists in the root manifests in the branch. As the *Brahma-Sūtra* says: All things follow out the contents of their roots in their development. In the net result of this discussion we may hold that grammar manifests language and language grammar, in a mutual dependence; even as the World-process, being the interplay of two factors, is evolved by Necessity, which Necessity, in turn, rests in and depends on the Pair.

<sup>1</sup> This sentence is the key to the whole discussion, which may otherwise seem mere logomachy. In strict truth, from the transcendental standpoint, laws are contemporaneous with the facts which they govern; there is no succession between them. From the empirical standpoint, dealing with the limited, laws *precede* facts which they cause to arise as effects; but the human discovery of laws *succeeds* the observation of facts. Hence, while that architectonic of all or any language or languages whatsoever, that scheme of laws or causes, by which and according to which all or any language is evolved, may be said to precede all languages or any particular language, the language itself *manifests* first and its laws are afterwards gathered up by observers into the science called grammar. So Brahmā (the Third Logos of Theosophical literature) *manifests* and is *named* first, and then in succession, Viṣṇu (the Second) and Shiva (the First Logos).

The essential purpose or significance of language is the expression, communication to another person, of one person's desire. The mutual expression of needs is language. These needs arise necessarily out of the universal and incessant operation of cognition, desire and action, and in this successive order.<sup>1</sup> Thus when I have a cognition, 'this is so and so,' that cognition gives rise to, is linked with, a desire, whence arises action in turn. But it happens very often that my desire cannot be fulfilled unless I express it to others. The reason for this state of things—that the desire of one should be capable of comprehension and fulfilment by another at all—is this: The Self is full and complete and exists everywhere and is one, whence I and another are the same; but the individualised self is not full, it is incomplete, imperfect, and therefore necessarily and always endeavors to project itself into the Full I; and this projection is the inner

<sup>1</sup> All mere description, of historical or scientific laws or facts, will also always be found on analysis to have ultimately a reference to a *purpose*, a wish, the wish to guide future action so as to secure happiness and avoid sorrow. This is the doctrine of the current *Mīmāṃsā* system of philosophy. The *Vedānta* adds just one exception: the only knowledge which is its own end, and leads to no further action, is the knowledge of Brahmān, the Self.

significance of the statement, by one individual, of his desire, to another. Because all Self is one, therefore all selves are one, and therefore everything can and may and should be communicated, revealed, unveiled, to every one by every one. And language—spoken or sound-language in this particular cycle—is the means of such communication.

In other words and from another standpoint, the desire that is in me can be fulfilled and satisfied only by communication to another, because, as explained before, desire is ever-fulfilled (Bliss) in the Whole and ever-unsatisfied (Want) in the part; and resting, abiding in, being in rapport with, the Whole is *yoga*, and *yoga* is the conjunction, the union, of the I and the This; and so the disclosing of the I to the This and of the This to the I is the using of language<sup>1</sup>. The two, Self and Not-Self, are the Complete only when together; either, by itself, were incomplete; hence the mutual exchange of what is in me but not in another (regarded as not-me) and *vice versa*.

<sup>1</sup> In the previous paragraph, the point of view is that of many individual selves side by side with each other; in this it is that of each individual self regarding itself as the Whole Self and all else as Not-Self. This may be gathered fully from what follows.

It should be noted that to any one individual I, another individual I or self is but a This, a not-Self; and hence the manifestation of manyness in and to the individual. The regarding of the Self as different from the Not-Self, the treating of all things else as not-Self and as separate from one's self, the consciousness which says 'that which I am, This is not'—this is the primal manyness. In the midst of such manyness is mutual converse possible, and that conversation is language.

As a man may issue from his house and, wandering in a forest, may get lost, and, running round and round in the darkness, may not find his home till he emerges on a good road; and the cause thereof would be only the darkness of his ignorance of the true road, and the fixed belief that one special place only was his home, for, otherwise, he would either be able to take the straight road to his house at once, or would make a residence for himself anywhere in the forest, or, indeed, anywhere on the surface of the earth; even so, the I, believing itself to be (identified with only one "this" and) different from all (other) 'this's,' spreads around itself this net of manyness and suffers pain and want and incompleteness, and, in ignorance (of the essential unity), desires to utter (its wishes) to *another*.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Compare the idea of *sannyāsa*, the fourth

Otherwise, truly, there would be and is no sound, no space, no time. As has been said: Where knowledge arises in fullness, there words disappear; they appear and reappear only when and where separateness appears. Knowledge destroys separateness, and then all sounds vanish; only the AUM remains.

Thus, then, we see that language arises and exists only for the expression of desire and necessity. And by the proper use of language man attains to honor, importance, weight, gaurava, exalted 'teachership,' the highest goals; by the non-use or misuse thereof he slays himself and his interests. The unnecessary, *i. e.*, improper word is the vāg-vajra, the 'word-lightning' that destroys the utterer. The words that express the desire fully and adequately are useful; all others are useless. Hence the same kind of speech is not appropriate for all occasions; sometimes sweet words, sometimes bitter, at others even and equable ones are needed. All of which is taught by grammar.

In other words, the difference between language and grammar is that the former is the utterance of one's desire in any way or manner, any how, whereas the latter is the orderly arrangement of the words, or the order governing the effective employment of the words.

stage of life, of 'homeless' wandering, when all the world has become 'home'.

The reasons for studying grammar may be more precisely enumerated thus: (a) The due guarding or proper choice of words. (b) The formation of well-connected and well-reasoned speech; 'is this the proper time for this or not,' etc. (c) The observance of the appropriate occasion, as ascertainable from the *Āgama*, the scriptural sciences; speaking with a due regard for the needs and requirements of others as fixed by nature; whence accrue trustworthiness and authority. (d) Brevity, the use of few words conveying much meaning. (e) Freedom from ambiguity, avoidance of words which may give rise to doubt as to the meaning intended.<sup>1</sup>

Grammar should be primarily studied in (and of) the mother-tongue, for the communication of desires is most needed amidst the surroundings and the people, the country and the family, amidst which one is born. When one goes to another country, or into another family, then only does he need to know another language. Not knowing his own language well, what advantage can a person derive from another tongue? All these things are regulated by necessity, as usual. Without necessity, a language is not learnt. And many varieties arise in consequence of the operation of necessity. Thus,

<sup>1</sup> These reasons are mentioned in the current *Mahā-Bhāṣhya* of Patañjali also.

some know their own as well as many other tongues; some know their own and none other; others do not know even their own tongue (well); still others (even if they know) are disinclined to speak, by temperament.

*Prājñāpana*, communication, corresponds to A; *vyākaraṇa*, grammar, to U; and *bhāṣhā*, language, to M. Hence the tradition that the grammarians know the *Prāṇava* pre-eminently, and that grammar should be studied for the due understanding of the *Prāṇava*.

Grammar primarily imparts knowledge of words, *śabdās*, and of the correct use of words. A word is a collection of *varṇas*<sup>1</sup>, letters. By the successive conjunction of letters all words arise, e. g., the word *Āṭmā* is made up of two 'a's, one *ṭ*, an *m*, and again two 'a's.

Differences of tone, *udātṭa*, high, *anudātṭa*, low, and *svariṭa*, even, are also explained in grammar.

Besides teaching the origin of words, their necessity, and their mutual connexion, it also explains what sound-word or language prevails in which part of the world-system and in what time-cycle; what the relation is between the time and the language; between the time and

<sup>1</sup> The word means letters, as well as colors and also castes. The significance of this multiplicity of meanings will appear later.

the *padārṭha*, the thing meant, implied, connoted or denoted by the term or word; and, again, between the word and its import, the thing indicated by it. And all this is explained with reasons and in the light of principles.

The *forms* and *colors* of sounds or words are also described therein. It is true that sounds belong to *ākāśha* and as such have no visual quality, form or color; still, at the present stage of evolution of our world-system, because of the commixture of the *ṭaṭṭvas*, the elements, sounds have come to possess corresponding colors and forms. When *ākāśha* mixes with and manifests its nature in *vāyu*, its property sound also does so. The case is the same with colors, black, yellow, etc. The forms and colors of word-sounds follow the constituent *tejas* elements of the things named by them; for instance, when it is said that such and such a thing is composed (predominantly) of *ākāśha* or *vāyu* or *tejas*, and is named by such and such a name, what happens is that the property of the other (non-prominent component) *tejas*-element (present in the thing) is imposed on and associated with the name-sound. (That is to say, the name-sound corresponding to the *ākāśha*-factor in an object becomes inseparably connected with the color, taste, touch, smell, etc., belonging to the other

elemental factors entering into the composition of that object, and that, instead of saying in the correct but cumbersome way that such and such an object is made up of such and such items and has such and such sense-qualities, people say somewhat loosely but conveniently for practical purposes that such and such a sound *has* such and such a visible quality). One particular name-sound becomes the recognised appellation of one thing, only when it becomes established as an indispensable item in all the 'behaviour,' the 'life,' or the practical uses and applications, of that thing. (In this wise, the various elements receive, each of them, many names.) Ākāsha entering into or working in vāyu receives the name of vyoma; in tejas, of gagana; and so on.<sup>1</sup> Because sound is the property of ākāsha, and ākāsha pervades, enters into the composition of, all things, therefore all things can be designated in terms of sound.<sup>2</sup> The nature and mode

<sup>1</sup> Which indicates how each one of so-called 'synonyms' in Samskr̥t, the 'well-constructed' language, has a special and most important philosophical and scientific significance unfortunately lost now to the public, for hundreds of years, but to be recovered anew, let us hope, by earnest and reverent-minded study.

<sup>2</sup> All this paragraph seems to be full of important and illuminative suggestions. Many difficulties

of the sound-name of everything corresponds to the nature and mode (*i.e.*, sub-division, atomic arrangement, vibration, etc.) of the ākāsha-factor in it, and, because of this, sounds, although all equally born of ākāsha, differ in different conditions, as for instance, they become in consequence of affection, or anger either sweet or bitter, soft or harsh, endurable or unbearable, fair or foul.

Sounds, words, are universal because ākāsha is universal. The relation of identity between the two is that of supporter and supported, āḍhāra and āḍheya, substance and attribute (which, while distinguishable, are yet one and the same). Ākāsha is the substratum of sound; hence the latter is the property of the former. As the body is nothing without the jīva and the jīva nothing without the body—such too is the relation between ākāsha and sound. Hence the statement that sound is of

and conflicting theories of comparative philology about the origin and nature of language, and incidentally also the differences of the various philosophical theories known as nominalism, realism, conceptualism, etc., seem to be reconciled and set at rest by the views propounded here.

Given a certain constitution of the senses of knowledge in an individual, given also a certain elemental composition of an object in the presence of that individual, it naturally follows that each component

the nature of or is ensouled by or is the soul of ākāśha.

element of the object having a certain sense-quality will be apprehended in terms of that quality by each corresponding sense-organ of the individual; and the sensations arising in the individual will, for the future, be to him the marks, remembrances, designations of that object. Such will be the individual's *original* 'names' for the object he comes across, which names he will be able to reproduce (to others according to his necessities, making himself intelligible to them so far as they have a constitution similar to his), by means of his organs of action respectively corresponding to his organs of sensation. Differences will be made by the differing sensory and motor constitution of different individuals. The individuals of one family, tribe, race, stock, having similar physical and physiological constitutions of their sensor and motor apparatus will have similar names and a similar language; to the extent that their constitutions differ their names will differ, giving rise to personal peculiarities, differences of pronunciation, mannerism, dialects, and finally widely different languages.

These, on the views set forth in the text, would appear to be the fundamental principles of comparative philology, (the Science of Language in the fullest sense, and not merely that of grammar proper in the modern sense), and all the other philological laws would be subordinate to them.

Sound corresponds to A; ākāśha to U; the absence of both is M.

We may note especially that language, though it is sound-language predominantly at the present stage of animal and human evolution, is, on the views of the text, capable of being rendered equally well in terms of any other sense, provided the motor-organ corresponding to that sense is properly developed. It so happens that the present human has developed only the vocal apparatus, for producing sound, corresponding to the ear, the organ for apprehending it. Later humanity, at a higher stage of evolution, probably some millions of years hence, or even in subsequent rounds, may develop corresponding organs for reproducing touches, colors, tastes, smells, etc., with the same facility and in equal perfection. Then they would be able to communicate with each other in any one of these many languages. And evidence of this possibility we may see even to-day in parts of the sign-languages of deaf-mutes or foreigners and the various ways of communication of insects, birds and beasts, some of whom communicate with each other by touch, others by smell, etc. The hands, made of the *tejas-tattva*, in one aspect, are the natural organs of color or form-production. As regards the possibilities of other organs, the story of the king R̥ṣhabha-deva in the *Viṣṇu-Bhāgavata* gives us suggestions. That at our present stage of evolution, the production of speech should be connected with the organ for the apprehension of taste, *rasa*

Because ākāśha and sound are connected with (and present in the composition and constitution of)<sup>1</sup> all things, therefore is there one lan-

and that the reproduction of life should be connected with a karmendriya also formed of the āpas-taṭṭva (*Manu*, I. 8, 10; *Viṣṇu-Bhāgavata* III. xxvi. 57, etc.)—is matter for reflexion and occult research. Metaphysically, all possible combinations must also actually manifest, sometime, somewhere; and these are only particular instances.

<sup>1</sup> In this fact may be seen the explanation of the literal aspect of the assertion that the AUM-sound is the source and origin of the world. We may try to understand the statement thus: Earth is the source of all earthenware; and its primal property, whatever it be, is the parent of all the 'peculiar' properties that the different kinds of earthenware display. Suppose now that earth and its elemental homogeneous property were reducible into 'water' and its primal property; that into 'fire'; that into 'air'; that into 'ākāśha' and sound. Then we could say that ākāśha and its property were the homogeneous source of all the heterogeneous things and properties which make up the present world. Now this primal, elemental, homogeneous sound is the AUM-sound. (See Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣhya* on the *Māndūkya-Upaniṣat*.) The hum of the bee, the crooning of the infant, the distant boom of the ocean, the roar of rivers and great towns, all the notes of the gamut, are modifications of it, as all nourishing foods and tastes are modifications of the

guage which covers the whole samsāra, and there is a universal grammar corresponding to it. In that language no changes take place; it shines fixedly like Brahman everywhere. It is true that there is a manyness included within Brahman also, but that is always subordinated to the Unity; and such is the case with this universal language also. It is the Samsāra-parā, and for these reasons is specially dominated the Samskr̥t,<sup>1</sup> for it is 'consecrated'. The consecrational nourisher milk and its taste. All the heterogeneous pre-exists in the homogeneous; all the functions of the waking life in sushupti; all the life of the Not-Self in the samādhi of the Self. To make the one richer, we must make a deeper plunge into the other. The stronger the nirodha, the stronger the vyūṭṭhāna afterwards, and vice versa. By arriving at the pinhole in a pinhole camera, an atom from a ray of light millions of miles distant has a chance of passing on to another ray of light, which it could not reach otherwise. So by 'practice' of japa of the AUM-sound, may a jīva secure special results; and even more by meditating on the 'meaning' of it, for that leads to subtler planes of matter. (See *Yoga-Sūtra*, I. 27, 28.) By going back to the 'origins' we can make fresh advances in new directions.

<sup>1</sup> Samsāra-parā may be regarded as the proper name of the language, (? the Senzār of *The Secret Doctrine*), or it may be interpreted simply as a description of it, 'concerned with the whole world-