

to anukalpa. And as the three factors of the logion are one, so these three are also one.

Other correspondences, from different standpoints may be noted :—

A—saṅkalpa—kāmanā—syām  
 U—vikalpa—ichchhā—bahu  
 M—anukalpa—kāṅkṣhā—asmi  
 or  
 kāmanā—kāṅkṣha  
 kāṅkṣha—ichchhā  
 ichchhā—kāmanā

Abandoning saṅkalpa and vikalpa, the jīva becomes a yōgi and dwells constantly in anukalpa<sup>1</sup>. The yōgi is he who 'joins together all things into one,' who knows that all experiences come to all. The mukṭa is he who is 'delivered' from the belief, the heresy, of the separateness of the Three. The brāhmaṇa is he who knows Brahman.

The process of saṅkalpa-vikalpa-anukalpa makes up vichāra, thought, thinking, mind-*'moving,'* mind-*'revolving.'* The power that decides, that brings out nishchaya,

<sup>1</sup> 'Living in the present,' 'presence of mind,' 'enough for the day is the evil thereof,' 'whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with all thy might,' 'resourcefulness,' 'readiness for all happenings,' 'power of adjustment,' 'adaptability'—are the words which help to bring out the significance of the condition, from the empirical standpoint.

certainty, 'final choice,' from amidst these processes, is buḍḍhi, intelligence, intellect, or reason. Vichāra is the work or action of buḍḍhi, (aḍhyavasāya or nishchaya being the fruit of that action). Sanḍeha, doubt, corresponds to Samsāra, the World-process, manyness, and to vikalpa or vacillation. Nishchaya, certainty, decision or determination, corresponds to Ātmā, the Self and the One, and to saṅkalpa or resolve. Siddhānta or 'established truth' gathers and sums up both.

Vichāra, from another standpoint, subdivides into asmr̥ti, vismr̥ti and anusmr̥ti, non-remembrance, forgetting,<sup>1</sup> and expectation, respectively. Smr̥ti, recollection, is the significance or characterising essence of them all, that is to say, the nature of recollection defines the nature of the other mental processes.

The power or faculty of recollection is buḍḍhi, for only the certain, the decided and determined, facts are remembered. That which has been ascertained in all ways, as 'this is thus only'—the

<sup>1</sup> Vismr̥ti seems to be more like 'erroneous recollection' than mere negative 'forgetting' which would be only non-remembrance already separately mentioned. Also, from one standpoint, it would seem that smr̥ti, asmr̥ti, and vismr̥ti are the trinity of which the summation is anusmr̥ti.

holding of such an ascertained fact in the mind through all time, with the belief that other than it is not possible—such is the form or nature of memory. That which is uncertain and unnecessary<sup>1</sup> with respect to oneself, 'was it, is it, or could it be thus or not thus?'—such is the form of *vismṛti*, forgetting. The cause of *vismṛti* is *bhrama*, 'wandering,' inattention, delusion. The 'power' or faculty of *vismṛti* is therefore *abuḍḍhi*, non-intelligence, the nature of which is uncertainty. *Anusmṛti* comes out, arises by, or by means of a combination of *smṛti* and *vismṛti*. That which occurred in the past has been forgotten; that which belongs to to-day, the present time, is being remembered; what has occurred and occurs in past and present time will also occur in the future;—this set of facts and beliefs, permeated with hope, is the form or nature of *anusmṛti*, 'after-memory,' expectation. The power or faculty of *anusmṛti* is *sudhī*, the good or discerning intellect. *Vismṛti* refers to past time, *smṛti* to present, and *anusmṛti* to future.

<sup>1</sup> The word 'unnecessary' seems to have a retrospective significance here; it is only what is not felt to be necessary and does not arouse interest and so arrest attention which is not strongly and accurately impressed on the memory.

Other correspondences may be noted as follows:—

A—*Ātmā—smṛti—pratyakṣha—saṅkalpa—*  
kāṅkṣhā.

U—*Samsāra—anusmṛti—nirāya—anukalpa—*  
āshā.

M—*Niṣheḍha—vismṛti—anumāna—vikalpa—*  
ichehḥā.

*Vichāra*, thinking, is the *saṭṭā*, the being, of all three, and *jñāna*, cognition, knowledge, underlies and unifies them all.

Memory and expectation are, it is obvious, mutually dependent. *Anusmṛti*, (as association of ideas) expectation, even etymologically means 'that which follows memory,' *smaraṇam anu*. Memory too, conversely, depends on expectation (through the desire for results in the future which stimulates and strengthens memory; which, indeed, justifies the existence of memory and makes it useful and therefore possible and necessary). Some other aspects of this side of consciousness may be noted. *Smaraṇa*, recollection, refers to all-time (and belongs 'to the ideal'). *Dhāraṇā*, holding, holding in consciousness, is in essence the same thing as *smaraṇa*<sup>1</sup>, (but belongs to the 'real').

<sup>1</sup> As with 'wish' and, 'desire,' so with 'memory' and 'recollection' or 'remembrance,' the meaning seems to have changed in the course of the development of the words from the roots. The root of

They may be distinguished thus: S m a r a ṇ a is the means; ḍ h ā r a ṇ ā is the accomplishment. S m a r a ṇ a is the action; ḍ h ā r a ṇ ā is the result thereof. 'That which is seen or heard or cognised *now* (in this particular time), *is* always (in all-time)'—such is the work of ḍ h ā r a ṇ ā. Because there is no real difference between *now* and *then* (both being aspects of the partless 'emptiness' called time) therefore all is everywhere and always.

'memory' and 'smṛṭi' is possibly the same, but smṛṭi now has more the significance of recollection or act of remembrance from time to time, while ḍ h ṛ ṭ i implies persistency, or tenacity of holding in consciousness, the *power* of memory, or retentiveness. So 'desire' is now used with an implication of greater permanence and depth than 'wish,' and therefore is for practical purposes a better equivalent to i c h c h h ā than 'wish,' notwithstanding that the latter seems to be derived from the same root i ṣ h as i c h c h h ā. Another fact worth noting is that though some of the explanations given, in the text above, of k ā m a n ā, seem to mark it as the more comprehensive word and the fitter to take the middle place in the triple sub-division of consciousness recognised in this work, yet as a fact i c h c h h ā is given this place between j ñ ā n a and k r i y ā throughout the remaining sections of the book. Other allied meanings of ḍ h ṛ ṭ i are endurance, patience, self-possession, non-self-forgetfulness, etc.

Thus there is no real difference between ḍ h ṛ ṭ i and smṛṭi, memory and recollection. S m a r a ṇ a is a form of cognition; the safe 'placing' away of that which is obtained thereby is ḍ h ṛ ṭ i.

The knowledge that is or lies between Ā ṭ m ā and S a m s ā r a, that is to say, the knowledge of S a m s ā r a from the point of view of Ā ṭ m ā and the knowledge of the Self from the point of view of the world—this is smṛṭi or s m a r a ṇ a. 'The world is'—this is the knowledge (of the world) by the Self. 'The Ā ṭ m ā is'—this is the knowledge of (the Self by) the world. The binding together of the two in the way or by the means of *is*—is smṛṭi. The connectedness, the conjointness, the condition of their being merged together, is ḍ h ṛ ṭ i. Thus it is said that the world is *held* within the Self, and the Self *held* within the world. That the world never exists apart from the Self, and the Self never apart from the world—this is the nature (and consequence) of ḍ h ṛ ṭ i. The standing together, the conjunctive condition, of things which have one common being, which are not in reality separate, but appear as separate—this is memory. Its nature, its form, is that of the mutual dependence and implication of all things whatsoever; everything contains all things whatsoever. Even in separateness, the two, the

Self and the Not-Self, are connected as 'other-and-other,' 'each-other,' *para para*; this reference to 'the other' exists inviolably and necessarily in each. Therefore the combination of the two (or, rather, the holding of the whole Not-Self in the Self by the Self) is memory (*i.e.*, is the fact or the principle which manifests in the consciousness of the individual *jīva* as memory).

Cognition, knowledge, is possible only by means of the senses, (that is to say, only when the Self has become identified with a limited organism), and only when two things (subject and object on the one hand, and the two factors of opposed pairs, *dvandva*, both factors falling under the term 'object,' on the other hand) come together<sup>1</sup>.

The *succession* (of the moods, conscious states, psychoses) of the *jīva* is endless time. It is also

<sup>1</sup> This is a statement, in its fullest significance, of what is called in modern philosophy, the relativity of knowledge; also of the view that all knowledge begins in and is concerned about sensations in the proper sense of the term, *excepting* one knowledge, *viz.*, Self-Consciousness which includes all knowledge however. The debate about innate ideas, or the distinction between the 'matter' and the 'form' of knowledge, can never arise or is past for the student of this metaphysic.

the significance and constitution of memory, which too has therefore an endless stretch and extension. This endlessness, pseudo-infinity, is observable everywhere in the world, in time, action, speech, knowledge, etc. Each moment of time and each item of the others is connected with an endless series of other similar moments and items. We may notice memory within memory, and memory within that again, and so on, *ad infinitum*. We remember that we remembered; we hold that we held (such and such a view). We learn from the *Vedas* that there are *smṛti-sṛṣhti* and *mānasa-sṛṣhti*, 'worlds of memory' and 'worlds of mind or thought (or thought-forms)'. *Mānasa-vicāra*, 'mental-travel,' thinking, thought, is the thread of and through 'forgetfulness, memory, and expectation,' corresponding respectively to *vikalpa*, *saṅkalpa*, and *anukalpa*, doubt, resolve, and alternative resource.

We may consider a few illustrations: In the logion, *Aham-bahu-syām*, 'I—many—may-become,' the I is the *Aṭmā*, and the many is the *Samsāra*. The many in the I is memory. The I is mere oneness, and the memory of the many is necessary to it because of its relativity to the many. Without the memory of the many, the expression, 'may I become,' were impossible.

That such memory is existent everywhere (as sub-consciousness)<sup>1</sup> appears from the fact that this logion is embodied and illustrated in the life, for instance, of the vegetable kingdom also ; the one plant becomes the many seeds.

Memory embodies all procession, all progress and evolution. Taking shape as an ideal to strive after, working in the way of the constant contemplation of the lives of the Great Ones, it leads on the small to become like the great. Indeed, memory may be said to be identical with the whole of the World-process itself, being immanent in the conjunction of Self and Not-Self, Ātma and Samsāra, Aham and Bahu.

We may distinguish between jñāna and smarāṇa or cognition and memory by saying that the second stage or condition or transformation

<sup>1</sup> The preceding remarks about the distinctions between smṛti and dhṛti, etc., may have appeared obscure. Their meaning will become plain as soon as the significance of the Logion, I—not-I—Not, is realised. And when the nature of *memory* is understood in the light of this Logion, then the theoretical difficulties which now perplex psycho-physicists and those engaged in psychical research as to how to explain sub- or supra- or subliminal or supraliminal consciousness and as to whether individuals are in touch with cosmic consciousness or not, etc., will vanish. See *The Science of Peace*, pp. 287-298.

of cognition is memory ; jñāna precedes, smarāṇa succeeds. Jñāna belongs to all time, is beginningless and endless, in as much as it belongs to the present which includes past and future ; while memory belongs to the successive, to succession, to the beginnings and endings in time. Jñāna as a whole belongs to all-time, *i. e.*, to time as a whole ; but its parts equally necessarily belong to the parts and successions of time. These parts of jñāna or knowledge are named smṛti, recollection.<sup>1</sup>

Because memory is inseparably connected with time in its parts, *i. e.*, with beginnings and endings, therefore are there breaks of memory from birth

<sup>1</sup> The modern reader who has followed the development, in recent times, of the doctrine of the *continuum* of consciousness, in such works as James Ward's *Psychology*, Stout's *Manual of Psychology*, James' *Principles of Psychology*, etc., will find it easier to grasp the sense of the compressed text here, and will, reciprocally, find a most illuminating light thrown on the problems and the details left unexplained, at the last crux, in those works, by the metaphysic of psychology as expounded here. James especially has the characteristic of leading, and most brilliantly, right up to and then abruptly stopping short of that last step, which would complete the 'circle' of knowledge, and put, on the whole discussion and thought, the 'new' complexion of an achieved unification under which all things appear 'renewed'.

to birth ordinarily. The exceptions that occur from time to time, the cases of *yogīs*, the cases of *ḍivya-ḍṛṣhti*, 'divine sight' or clairvoyance, of *ṭri-kāla-jñā-tā*, 'knowledge of the three times, past, present, and future,' mean that what to the ordinary person would be a *series* of distinct periods, separate parts of time, and of memories, has become reduced into one time, one present, and one *praṭyakṣha*, direct and immediate cognition or intuition, to the seer. Ordinarily the 'present' signifies the time extending from the beginning to the finishing of some one act, one condition, one life-time; hence memory commonly ranges within one life-time only. Such succession, beginning and ending in time, past, present and future, is the only way, the *sine qua non*, of manifestation, of existence and non-existence. Apart from it there is neither 'is,' nor 'is not,' nor 'not is'. As said before *smṛti* refers to the present, *vi smṛti* to the past and *an u smṛti* to the future.

Each one of this triplet of past, present and future is repeated endlessly within each of the others. Such pseudo-infinity is observable everywhere in the World-process, as noted before. We have succession within succession, time within time, form within form, work within work, alphabet within alphabet, name within name, universe within universe, all within all, and *Brahman* within *Brahman*.

But while this pseudo-infinity of details within details corresponds to the infinity of the Universal Consciousness, each individual consciousness deals with and comprehends only a limited portion of the details. Hence we have the fact that what is called the omniscience of *Brahmā* and other high Gods signifies only that their 'memories' co-extend with vast but always limited cycles and circles of time and space and motion.

Memory is the basis of all reasoning, inference, argument, *anumāna* and *nirṇaya*, induction and deduction. *Praṭyakṣha*, direct cognition, is also used and summed up within it. The more comprehensive the memory, the stronger and more decided the other intellectual processes. Every *jīva* is potentially omniscient<sup>1</sup>.

But we cannot say that because the *jīva* possesses omniscience potentially therefore it

<sup>1</sup>The difference between *jīva* and *jīva* is due to the difference in the *order* of the events, or experiences. If this order or succession, a mere emptiness, is abolished, only the collective total of experiences remains and 'all' *jīvas* merge into One, and worlds go into *pralaya*. Thus we see that the mere order of the contents of memory is the foundation of separate individuality and is at every moment of our existence that which distinguishes us from one another. (*Yōga-Sūtra*, IV. 14 and *The Science of Peace*, p. 319).

possesses distinct memory through and of all time actually, for the word 'all' is, strictly, transcendental. Ordinarily, it means *the whole of some one series* only, for it is not independent of succession. Hence, memory, forgetting and expectation, appear even in those that are called omniscient. Omniscience, we see then, is also relative and comparative, and means, successively, with reference to the stages of the evolutionary growth of *jīvas*, 'full knowledge of the contents of a *yuga*, a *mahā-yuga*, a *kalpa*, a *mahā-kalpa*, a *manvantāra*, a *mahā-manvantāra*, etc'. Hence *yogīs* too cannot be said to possess full comprehension of the complete details of the *transcendental* 'all,' but only of the relative or comparative 'all' included in some one principal cycle.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Speaking of *yogīs* and *brāhmaṇas*, etc., as the holders of such knowledge, the author branches off here into a 'metaphysical' interpretation of the *Veda*-text which is regarded as the foundation of the caste-system of India. The interpretation may be gathered here in a foot-note because of its interest, and as a specimen of the thought of the author. 'The *brāhmaṇa* was Its mouth'—the mouth of *Brahman* means *jñāna*, knowledge; from and by knowledge only the *brāhmaṇa* was born, lives and shall live, always. 'The *rājanya* was made the arms'—the *rājanya* or *kṣhatṛiya* is he who is steadfast in the practice of *rājā-yoga*, the royal

This *āntaryā*,<sup>1</sup> 'relativity,' 'similarity in diversity,' extends everywhere. Like other greatness and smallness, great knowledge and or highest form of *yoga*; *bāhu*, (which is commonly explained as the arm, in accordance with current Samskr̥t grammar) is *Samsāra*, the World-process; he is the maker of *Samsāra* by means of the resolve 'May I become *bāhu* or many'. By the use of the word *bāhu*, (transformed by some rule of archaic Samskr̥t grammar into *bāhu*) it is meant that all the world has separately the right to *jñāna*, knowledge. 'The *vaiśya* came from the knee'—*jānu* (ordinarily meaning the knee but probably connected in archaic Samskr̥t with *jñā*, to know, in some way) means the extent of memory; '*jānu* is used for *smaraṇa*'. *Vaiśya* signifies the bringing of the senses into *vāśha* or control. 'The *shūdra* was born from the feet'—*pāda*, foot, refers to service. The realisation of all beings as the Self and consequent service of all—such is the characteristic of the *shūdra*. All these refer to the knowledge of *Brahman*. Such is the author's metaphysical reduction of the four castes into different stages in the growth of the same *jīva*, showing its gradual growth in *Brahman*-realisation, the stages being named by the names of the castes, but in an order the inverse of that currently given to them, the *shūdra* standing for the stage of highest self-sacrifice and therefore the most practical realisation of the Self.

<sup>1</sup> The modern Samskr̥t equivalent is *sāpekṣhya*.